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The importance of culture in helping explain and understand behavior is generally accepted. Scholars in the area of 
information security have argued that security culture is a key factor in safeguarding information assets. Scholars in 
the area of professional culture have argued that differences in cultures across professions must be accounted for, 
in correctly assessing the influence of culture. Combining these arguments, we suggest that differences in security 
cultures across professions need to be examined to fully comprehend the influences of security culture. The current 
study uses a qualitative approach to further the understanding of information security cultures across four 
professions: Information Systems, Accounting, Human Resources, and Marketing. The concept of security culture is 
articulated, and the security cultures of the four professions are characterized to demonstrate that there are 
significant variations in security culture across these professions. The study also shows that information security 
continues to be viewed as a technical problem, that even the most conservative and rule-compliant groups may 
violate security rules under performance pressure, and that awareness by itself is not sufficient to build a strong 
security culture.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Culture has emerged as a key construct in organizational and information systems (IS) research. There are myriad 
conceptualizations and definitions of culture (comprehensive reviews are provided by Leidner and Kayworth [2006]; 
Straub, Loch, Evaristo, Karahanna and Strite [2002]), but there is general agreement that culture includes a shared 
set of assumptions, values, and beliefs that help shape subsequent behavior of a social group [Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn, 1963]. When viewed at the organizational level, culture helps employees make sense of the firm and 
provides norms for their behavior [Deshpande and Webster, 1989; Gregory 1983]. It has also been shown that 
culture is predictive of performance [e.g., Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992]. As the need to safeguard information 
assets has become increasingly important [e.g., Dhillon, 1997; Von Solms, 2000], scholars have advocated the 
development of a strong information security culture
1
 to enhance protection of such assets [Ruighaver, Maynard and 
Chang, 2007; Vroom and Von Solms, 2004]. Researchers believe that technical controls and information security 
policies alone are not adequate to ensure information security. In addition to the technical controls and security 
policies, an information security culture is deemed necessary to ensure behavior compliant with information security 
needs [e.g., Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004].  
Most research in the area focuses on information security culture in the context of organizations [e.g., Ruighaver et 
al., 2007]. Furthermore, most researchers adopt a monolithic view of organizational security culture (i.e., that the 
security culture is uniform across different groups in organizations). Studies of culture (unrelated to security culture) 
in organizations have shown the existence of differentiated cultures [Chatman, Polzer, Barsade and Neale, 1998; 
Jermier, Slocum, Fry and Gaines, 1991], including differences in cultures across occupations and professions [Trice, 
1993]. Differentiated cultures have been shown to lead to differences in the thinking, reasoning, and priorities of 
different professional groups [Hansen, 1995; Mills and Tsamenyeni, 2000], which in turn could lead to 
intraorganizational conflicts and consequent failure of larger initiatives [e.g., Rao and Ramachandran, 2011]. 
Analogously, it can be argued that differences in information security cultures across professions could lead to 
differences in thinking and reasoning about security issues, and possibly conflicts in and failure of information 
security initiatives. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the differences in information security cultures 
across professions. Thus, the primary goals of the current research are to determine if there are differences in 
security cultures across professions, and, if so, what are the differences? Implicit in this statement is that we are 
studying information security culture at the level of a profession. 
An understanding of the differences is important both to research and to practice. In research, monolithic 
characterization of information security culture may obscure important relationships between security culture and 
other variables. For instance, a researcher examining the effect of security policies on security culture may not find 
any effect. In reality, it is possible that it affects the security culture of groups that tend to be more rule-compliant, 
and not that of groups who tend to be less rule-compliant. Examined as a whole, the relationship may be obscured. 
In practice, there is the possibility of conflicts between groups because of differences in security cultures. For 
instance, if a professional group believes that information security is the responsibility of information systems (IS) 
personnel, and information security personnel believe that all users are responsible, then it is possible that the 
professional group fails to take seriously security policies proposed by the IS group, particularly if the policies require 
effort by the professional group. The policies may be viewed by the professional group as an attempt by IS 
personnel to shirk their responsibilities. Knowledge of such differences in cultural beliefs will enable management to 
take steps necessary to ensure that security initiatives are not misconstrued. Thus, understanding the differences in 
security cultures across professions is important for the field of information security.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss relevant literature. Following this, we 
outline the theoretical bases and methodological issues. Next, we report our results. In the subsequent section, we 
present our key findings, summarize our contributions, and state the limitations of the study. Lastly, we make some 
concluding remarks. 
                                                     
1
 We use the terms “information security culture” and “security culture” interchangeably. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Culture  
The complexity and ambiguity associated with the study of culture has been acknowledged by scholars [Leidner and 
Kayworth, 2006; Schein, 2004; Trice and Beyer, 1993]. In 1963, Kroeber and Kluckhohn identified about 164 
definitions [Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1963]; in 2006, Leidner and Kayworth reported that there were about 359 
definitions [Leidner and Kayworth, 2006]. We provide a brief sampling of the definitions over the years to illustrate 
the complexity (see Table 1). The definitions appear to have two parts. The first part reflects that culture is viewed as 
an aggregation, and the second part lists the components. The aggregation aspect is seen in the part of the 
definition that states culture is viewed as “a complex whole which includes…,” “…embraces all the manifestations of 
…” “…the totality of ..,” “as the sum total of ..,” and so on. Culture is seen as an aggregation of components that 
includes terms such as “knowledge,” “beliefs,” “habits,” “values,” “ideas,” “behaviors,” “concepts,” “attitudes,” and so 
on.  
Table 1: Some Definitions of Culture from Literature 
Source Definition 
Tylor [1871] “…complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society.” (p. 1) 
Boas [1930] “Embraces all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the 
individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of 
human activities as determined by these habits.” (p. 79) 
Kroeber and Parsons 
[1958] 
“Transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas and other symbolic 
meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior and the artifacts 
produced through the behavior.” (p. 583) 
Thurnwald [1950] Defines culture as the totality of usages and adjustments that relate to family, political 
formation, economy, labor, custom, law, and ways of thought. 
Kluckhohn [1949] Defines culture as a “social legacy” that an individual acquires from his/her group. 
Geertz [1973]] “Historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” (p. 89) 
Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn [1952] 
“It is a plan, not the living itself; it is that which selectively channels men’s reactions, it is 
not the reaction themselves.” (p. 120) 
 
The complexity of the conceptualization presents challenges at two levels: in the meaning of the terms used to 
define culture, and in the observation and measurement of culture. Terms such as “beliefs” and “ideas” are mostly 
used in the common everyday meaning of the words, without precise definitions being assigned to them. When 
observing culture, the challenge is to determine if it is sufficient to focus on one or some aspects of culture or if all 
aspects have to be taken into consideration. Schein [1985] proposed a three-layer model, which addresses the 
second of these issues. The three layers comprise artifacts, values, and assumptions. Artifacts are visible 
manifestations, such as behavior, rituals, jargon, and so on. Values include social principles, standards, beliefs, and 
so on, which have intrinsic worth to the group. Assumptions include taken for granted beliefs. Schein’s model 
indicates that the three layers are interdependent, with artifacts and values having a reciprocal causal relationship, 
and values and assumptions having a reciprocal causal relationship. Because of the reciprocal relationships, it is 
usually considered sufficient to observe artifacts (such as rituals) or analyze beliefs to characterize cultures.  
In published research, empirical studies of culture, which attempt to characterize or measure dimensions of culture, 
have done so by observing behaviors or by eliciting beliefs (which may include beliefs related to values or beliefs 
related to assumptions) through questionnaires or interviews. For instance, Robey and Markus [1984] adopted a 
cultural approach to understanding the information systems development (ISD) process by analyzing rituals. In other 
words, they viewed the cultural process through the lens of the artifacts, since rituals are an observable form of 
artifacts. In contrast, Iivari and Abrahamsson [2002] examined the cultural differences between managers, software 
engineers, and user-centered design specialists by identifying their beliefs with respect to user-centered design 
(UCD). Thus, although culture includes both visible manifestations (artifacts) and beliefs (values and assumptions), 
a characterization of culture can be based on one or the other or both, regardless of the fact that the definition of 
culture includes artifacts and the beliefs that constitute values and assumptions. 
It should be noted that the term “belief” is used broadly in the literature on culture. This is best seen in this 
hypothetical example. A respondent could say, “All men are created equal,” which can be seen as a statement of 
value. Alternately, the respondent may say, “I believe ‘all men are created equal,’” which can be seen as a statement 
of belief. But the two statements lead to the same characterization of culture. Thus, in efforts to characterize culture, 
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the distinction between the terms such as “values” and “beliefs” are not critical. We use the term “belief” broadly to 
include statements or responses about values, assumptions, ideas, morals, customs, and so on.   
Professional Cultures 
The culture of specific professions has long been a subject of study for organizational scholars (e.g., night watchmen 
[Trice, 1993]; police [Van Maanen, 1973]). The existence of distinct cultural characteristics unique to individual 
professions has been documented. For example, accountants view themselves as rationalists [Pondy, 1983] who 
believe that the primary reality is a cold-blooded “bottom-line” [Trice and Beyer, 1993]. The culture of doctors is 
rooted in the Hippocratic Oath, which emphasizes the primacy of ‘do no harm’ [Smith and Kleinman, 1989]. The 
engineering culture in a high technology firm is described as being informal, where initiative and trust are important, 
and “working for money as a prime motivator will be abhorred” [Kunda, 1995, p. 75]. These findings support the idea 
that individuals who practice the same profession tend to band together into communities, draw their identities from 
the work they do, and share a set of values, norms, and attitudes, all of which form a part of their occupational 
culture [Van Maanen and Barley, 1984].  
More research has found evidence supporting the existence of a distinct occupational culture among IS 
professionals [Guzman et al., 2004; Guzman, Stam, and Stanton 2008; Rao and Ramachandran, 2011]. These 
studies have shown that IS professionals have a converging cluster of characteristics, reflecting such attributes as 
the technical nature of the occupation, the responsibilities of IS personnel associated with technology, and the use of 
technical jargon. Managers view IS professionals as responsible for not only the technology, but also “to help serve 
their staff so they can be the most efficient and productive, while at the same time protecting the organization from 
outside threats” [Guzman et al., 2004, p. 79].   
As mentioned earlier, differences in cultures across professions are often the source of differences in thinking, 
reasoning, and priorities [Hansen, 1995], which can lead to conflicts and dysfunctions. For instance, Iivari and 
Abrahamsson [2002] showed that managers believed that user-centered design (UCD) was theoretical and 
complicated, software engineers considered UCD as unimportant, while UCD specialists considered it important and 
useful. Rao and Ramachandran [2011] showed that IS personnel believed that technical jargon was essential for 
precise communication, while managers believed that technical jargon just confused non-technical people. Such 
differences in cultural beliefs can be readily seen to be potential sources of problems in the context of interactions 
between professional groups. This brief review indicates that groups belonging to different professions can have 
distinctly different beliefs, and such differences have the potential to cause dysfunctional interactions between the 
groups. Consequently, our premise is that different professional groups are likely to have distinct beliefs that would 
constitute distinct security cultures of their own. These differences need to be identified and understood to avoid 
dysfunctions in the design and implementation of information security initiatives. 
Security Culture 
In this sub-section, we discuss the importance of security cultures, the diverse conceptualizations of security culture 
in literature, and the efforts to identify the dimensions of culture. Lastly, we include a section on alternate 
approaches to improve security-related behaviors.  
The importance of security culture in the protection of information has been recognized for quite some time [e.g.,  
Andress and Fonseca, 2000; Beynon, 2001; Breidenbach 2000; Schwarzwalder, 1999; Von Solms, 2000]. 
Proponents argue that the development of a security culture in organizations would influence employee behavior 
over and beyond technological and managerial controls [Dhillon, 1995; Ruighaver et al., 2007; Vroom and Von 
Solms, 2004]. It has been argued that company policies alone are not adequate to ensure appropriate security 
behavior, but must manifest in a culture to produce the desired effects [Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004]. 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that while culture is expected to have a significant effect on security, such 
effect could be positive or negative [Vroom and Von Solms, 2004]. 
The acknowledgement of the importance of security culture has spawned a keen interest in research in this area. 
Notwithstanding the high level of interest, the concept of security culture is still evolving. In some early studies, 
security culture is left undefined [e.g., May, 2003]. In others, the definition is near circular. For instance, Gaunt 
[2000, p. 152] views security culture in a health environment as “a culture in which personal health care information 
is processed securely.” Still others [e.g., Knapp, Marshall, Rainer and Ford, 2006] measure security culture using 
survey items, such as, “Employees value the importance of security” and “A culture exists that promotes good 
security practices,” from which items the reader could infer the researchers’ conceptualization of security culture.  
A sampling of the definitions of security culture suggests diversity in thinking. Dhillon [1997] defines security culture 
as “the totality of patterns of behaviour [our italics] in an organization that contribute to the protection of information 
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of all kinds.” Martins and Eloff [2002, p. 205] see information security culture “as a set of information security 
characteristics. These characteristics such as integrity and availability of information [our italics]…. Information 
security culture is also seen as an assumption [our italics] about what is and what is not acceptable in relation to 
information security.” Helokunnas and Kuusisto [2003, p. 191] view security culture as “a system consisting of 
interacting framework and content category components [our italics] of information security,” where content includes 
“people attitude, motivation and knowledge including mental models about information security.” Others use 
Schein’s three-layer model as the basis and include artifacts and creations, collective values, norms and knowledge, 
basic assumptions and beliefs [e.g., Schlienger and Teufel, 2003]. Schlienger and Teufel use a questionnaire with 
ten items, which are not specifically classified as values, norms, or beliefs. The diversity of characterizations of 
security culture can be seen in these definitions. What is evident is that some researchers focus on behavior, while 
others focus on values and beliefs. Each of these belongs in one of the layers of the Schein [1985] model for culture. 
In other words, researchers base their definition and conceptualization of information security culture on the Schein 
model, which was originally proposed for culture.  
In the current study, we also view Schein’s model [Schein, 1985] as a basis for conceptualizing information security 
culture (i.e., information systems culture includes behaviors, values, and assumptions/beliefs that inform on the topic 
of security). Further, as we stated earlier, we use the term “belief” broadly to include all responses about knowledge, 
ideas, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. Also, as we have shown, it is usually adequate to examine a single 
aspect such as rituals or beliefs to characterize culture. In the current study, we will elicit beliefs from respondents in 
interviews to characterize information security cultures of professionals.  
Researchers who have delved a little deeper into conceptualizing security culture have drawn on two perspectives, 
primarily in an effort to propose methods or frameworks to improve organizational security culture. The first 
perspective is that of Schein [1985]. For example, Schlienger and Teufel [2003] attempt to assess the gap between 
employee perceptions at all three levels and the actual state in an organization. They do not explain how they 
arrived at the items that they use. Further, the items range from low level items, such as “Passwords should always 
have a length of at least eight characters and contain at least two alphanumeric characters in the middle,” to high 
level items such as, “Every employee should be trained in the information security controls he/she is supposed to 
use in his/her work.” 
Zakaria and Gani [2003] use the Schein model to create a checklist. They use elements underlying each of the three 
layers and intuitively propose specific items of interest in information security. For instance, for the artifacts (surface 
manifestations) layer, they consider the element, norms, and propose the item, “Never open any suspicious 
attachment file of e-mail or always update antivirus databases online,” for the checklist. Effectively, the items on the 
checklist reflect a do or don’t, which collectively are argued to improve security culture in an organization. The 
process by which items are generated is not discussed.  
Both articles [Schlienger and Teufel, 2003; Zakaria and Gani, 2003] are focused on enhancing information security 
in organizations by detailing low level behaviors that employees should comply with (e.g., using passwords with 
some characteristics or not opening suspicious attachments). Admittedly, these behaviors will improve information 
security and help develop a stronger information security culture in organizations. However, they are not useful in 
characterizing the information security culture of a group. 
In the second perspective, researchers have attempted to identify dimensions of security culture [e.g., Chia, 
Maynard and Ruighaver, 2002; Tejay and Dhillon, 2005] based on different theories. Chia et al. use Detert, 
Schroeder, and Mauriel’s framework [Detert, Schroeder and Mauriel, 2000], and Tejay and Dhillon used Hall’s 
classification of behavioral responses to the implementation of a new computer-based system in an organization 
[Hall, 1959].  
Chia et al. [2002] use the eight dimensions that Detert et al. [2000] proposed to characterize culture associated with 
the success of total quality management in organizations. The eight dimensions are: (1) the basis of truth and 
rationality, (2) the nature of time and time horizon, (3) motivation, (4) stability versus change/innovation/personal 
growth, (5) orientation to work, task, co-workers, (6) isolation versus collaboration/cooperation, (7) control, 
coordination, and responsibility, and (8) orientation and focus—internal and/or external. Chia et al. [2002] adapted 
these for the context of information security culture in organizations. Thus, for example, under the category of the 
basis of truth and rationality, they examine employee beliefs about the truth and rationality of what information 
security is and the importance of information security.  
A point to note is that the dimensions are not completely orthogonal, and instances of partial overlap can be 
identified. For example, under the dimension orientation to work, task, and co-workers, the authors include one 
statement that “employees should be made to feel responsible for security in the organizations,” and under the 
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dimension isolation versus collaboration/cooperation, they include that, “Every member of an organization should be 
involved in some way with maintaining security.” There is little, if any, distinction between the two statements, so this 
is a point of overlap between the two dimensions. There are other elements to each dimension that are different 
from each other. For example, the first dimension states that education of employees about security is important, 
while the second dimension emphasizes the importance of including all employees in the development of security 
policies. 
Chia et al. [2002] developed a qualitative comparison of two organizations along these dimensions. Their results 
indicate differences between the two organizations on several of the dimensions. For instance, organization A 
believed security to be very important, adopted a longer-term view, and had strict security policies in place. In 
contrast, organization B believed security to be less important, adopted a shorter-term view, and did not have strong 
security policies in place. In sum, the framework is useful in characterizing and comparing information security 
cultures of organizations.  
Tejay and Dhillon [2005] base their development of dimensions on Hall’s [Hall, 1959] classification of behavioral 
responses to the implementation of a new computer-based system in an organization. The responses or behavioral 
patterns are referred to as silent messages. Following Dhillon’s [1995] examination of the implications of the silent 
messages for information security, Tejay and Dhillon [2005] have developed these further to propose dimensions for 
information systems culture. The seven constructs that they have proposed are group cohesiveness, professional 
codes, informal work practice, empowerment, planning, information security awareness, and organizational 
structure. Tejay and Dhillon [2005] have developed multi-item scales for each dimension and argue that the 
dimensions are useful in assessing the information security culture of an organization. 
There are some issues worthy of note. First, both frameworks are focused on information security culture in 
organizations. Second, they are both prescriptive in nature (i.e., trying to suggest ways in which information security 
culture in organizations can be strengthened). For instance, Chia et al. [2002] indicate that “Employees should [our 
italics] …” in some of their statements, implying prescriptive suggestions. An example from Tejay and Dhillon [2005] 
would be their hypothesis “Lack of planning would have impact on information security culture of an organization,” 
implying prescriptively that planning is necessary. Lastly, there are overlapping aspects to the points underlying both 
sets of dimensions. The overlaps are not relevant to the current study, so they are not discussed further. 
Based on our literature review of the information security culture, we believe that research in the area is still at an 
early stage. Our review points to three significant issues. First, the concept of security culture draws on the concepts 
developed for culture in general (e.g., Schein’s model). Second, diverse approaches are being used to assess 
information security culture. Third, security culture has been studied in an organizational context and viewed from an 
integrated perspective (i.e., security culture is seen as uniform throughout the organization, with minor exceptions). 
An example of the exception would be the study by Ruighaver et al. [2007], who examine the differences in security 
beliefs of IT managers and end-users [Ruighaver et al., 2007]. No study exists that examines differences in security 
cultures across professions. 
In the next sub-section, we briefly discuss alternate approaches to improve security-related behaviors. 
Alternate Approaches to Improve Security-Related Behaviors 
The development of security culture is one approach to improving security-related behaviors. Other approaches are 
possible. Published literature on alternate approaches includes both descriptive and prescriptive studies. Descriptive 
studies focus on identifying factors that influence security-related behaviors, while prescriptive studies propose and 
test methods to improve security-related behaviors. For instance, descriptive studies have shown that social 
influence [e.g., Herath and Rao, 2010; Johnston and Warkentin, 2010; Lee and Larsen, 2009], self-efficacy [e.g., 
Bulgurcu, Cavasoglu and Benbasat, 2010], perceived threat characteristics (e.g., threat severity [Johnston and 
Warkentin, 2010], and threat appraisal [Lee and Larsen, 2009]), neutralization [Siponen and Vance, 2010], 
awareness [Bulgurcu et al., 2010], and so on, influence attitudes and intentions to comply with security policies.  
It is possible to infer prescriptive measures from the descriptive studies. For instance, the finding that awareness 
increases compliance suggests that organizations should implement initiatives to increase awareness of security-
related issues among employees. Prescriptive studies recommend mandatory compliance [Boss, Kirsch, 
Angermeier, Shingler and Boss, 2009; Kwon and Johnson, 2011; Smith, Winchester, Bunker and Jamieson, 2010], 
deterrence [D’Arcy and Herath, 2011], fear appeals [Johnston and Warkentin, 2010], training [e.g., Puhakainen and 
Siponen, 2010], user participation [Spears and Barki, 2010], and so on.  
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The long list of explanatory factors is overwhelming initially, but a deeper examination shows two points. First, the 
prescriptive factors tend to work over different temporal frames. Second, the factors, while distinct in some ways, 
have overlapping characteristics. Each of these points is discussed next. 
Viewing the factors from the temporal frame, prescriptive methods to improve security-related behaviors can be 
classified as short term or medium term. Mandatory compliance may seem to be the method with the most potential 
for effecting immediate changes in the short term. Monitoring [Boss et al., 2009] and auditing [Kwon and Johnson, 
2011] enhance the perception that compliance is mandatory, and thereby improve adherence to security-related 
rules, policies, and procedures. Boss et al. [2009] report that mandatory compliance rules lead to actual compliance, 
but Smith et al. [2010] report that only 33 percent of organizations complied with mandatory policies. It is interesting 
to note that Kwon and Johnson [2011] did not find a correlation between compliance and security performance. 
Further, mandatory compliance programs include deterrence to motivate employees to observe rules. The 
effectiveness of deterrence remains to be established conclusively. A review published by D’Arcy and Herath [2011] 
shows that deterrence is not uniformly effective across published studies. Thus, it would appear that short-term 
initiatives may need to be supplemented with medium and longer term initiatives. 
Medium-term initiatives include fear appeals [Johnston and Warkentin, 2010], user participation [Spears and Barki, 
2010], training [e.g., Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010], and similar measures. Results from such initiatives have been 
mixed. Johnston and Warkentin [2010] have shown that fear appeals can influence behavioral intentions to comply 
with security requirements, but the effect is not uniform across all end-users. Spears and Barki [2010] have shown 
that user participation in the formulation of legally mandated compliance programs leads to greater awareness of 
security, better alignment of security management to the business environment, and improved control processes for 
ensuring security. Puhakainen and Siponen [2010] report the effective implementation of training programs based on 
two theories—the universal constructive instructional theory and the elaboration likelihood model. Key findings of the 
study were that it was necessary to stimulate cognitive processing of material presented during training sessions, 
and a continuous communication process is needed to improve compliance. In examining the medium-term 
initiatives, it may be observed that the primary focus of each of these initiatives is different, but there are some 
overlapping aspects between them. For instance, training can be a forum to communicate three elements of a fear 
appeal—severity, susceptibility, and the appropriate response to a security incident—and to provide the employee 
with the fourth element of the fear appeal (i.e., the ability to perform the recommended response). Also, one goal of 
training is to increase awareness. User participation in formulating policies also serves to increase awareness. 
Even as the medium-term initiatives have different foci, but share some commonalities, security culture, while 
distinct from these medium-term initiatives, also shares some commonalities with them. A comparison of security 
culture to each of the alternate approaches is possible. As an exemplar, we will compare security culture to one 
alternate factor, security awareness, to highlight commonalities and differences. 
Schein’s model [Schein, 1985] of security culture includes values, norms, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. There are 
different ways to develop or change culture. They include setting examples by senior executives [e.g., Leach, 2003], 
education [e.g., Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004], and so on. In particular, it is generally accepted that culture is 
built over a longer period of time and is deeply ingrained. Awareness, on the other hand, is typically defined as “the 
extent to which organizational members understand the importance of information security; the level of security 
required by the organization and their individual security responsibilities” [Albrechtsen, 2007, p. 280]. Education and 
repeated reminders are seen as the primary ways to raise and maintain awareness [e.g., Thompson and Von Solms, 
1998].  
The overlap between the two terms is that education is seen as a means to develop strong security culture and 
increase security awareness. Security awareness is seen as a contributor to the development of security culture [Da 
Veiga and Eloff, 2010; Lim, Ahmad, Chang and Maynard, 2010]. The distinction between the two terms is that high 
awareness does not necessarily equate to strong culture. Groups may be highly aware of security-related issues but 
choose not to comply with security requirements for various reasons. By definition, the lack of compliance implies 
weak security culture. Thus, it is possible to have high security awareness but weak security culture. 
In sum, the literature review emphasizes the complexity of the culture construct, as well as the importance of 
examining differences in professional cultures and diverse aspects of information security culture. In the section on 
information security culture, current thinking about the importance of security culture is mentioned, definitions are 
examined, and the existing frameworks to study security culture in organizations are articulated. Lastly, we provide a 
brief overview of the various factors discussed in the security literature to explain security-related behaviors, and 
various methods suggested to enhance the behaviors; this overview also includes an exemplar comparison of 
security culture and security awareness, to illustrate the overlapping and distinguishing characteristics of that 
security culture from other initiatives. 
  
170 
Volume 33 Article 11 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the current study, our goal is to characterize the information security cultures of different professions, and 
examine the differences across them. Information security cultures of professions is an understudied phenomenon. 
For this reason, we elected to conduct a qualitative study (i.e., conduct interviews of professionals from selected 
professional groups to develop a descriptive characterization of the information security cultures of their respective 
professions). Miles and Huberman [1994] categorize qualitative studies as tight or loose, and discuss the trade-offs 
between them. They refer to tight designs as those that use a preexisting conceptual framework, and to loose 
designs as those in which the conceptual framework emerges during the course of the study. They recommend 
loose designs for understudied phenomena. They also recognize that even in loose designs the researcher comes 
to the study with some orienting ideas. Eisenhardt [1989] recommends that some a priori description of 
conceptualizations, constructs, and dimensions can help develop a study’s initial design.  
In the current situation, there is no preexisting conceptual framework for the study of information security cultures of 
professional groups. However, there are frameworks proposed by Chia et al. [2002] and Tejay and Dhillon [2005] for 
the study of information security cultures in organizations. These frameworks are not directly applicable in their 
original formulation for two reasons: (1) the frameworks are for information security cultures of organizations, while 
our interest is on the information security cultures of professions (the examination of information security cultures at 
the level of the profession), and (2) the frameworks are prescriptive in nature, while our interest is in developing 
descriptions of the information security cultures of the different professions. Nonetheless, the two frameworks 
contain features that can help in formulating a starting point for our study.  
The two frameworks have been used to generate issues to address in the characterization of information security 
culture (see Tables 2 and 3). The process followed to arrive at the issues is as follows. The points discussed by Chia 
et al. [2002] and Tejay and Dhillon [2005] under each of their respective dimensions were first listed. The points are 
shown in the tables. If we considered them useful in identifying issues relevant to the information security cultures of 
professionals, then appropriate issues were noted. If a dimension was focused on an organizational aspect, and did 
not include any points that were useful for characterizing information security cultures of professionals, then it was 
excluded. For instance, Tejay and Dhillon [2005] include planning as a dimension based on the logic that planning 
was important to improving the information security culture of organizations. Planning does not help in 
understanding or describing the information security culture of professional groups. So, no issue is derived from this 
dimension. The reasons for excluding other dimensions are indicated in Tables 2 and 3.  
In effect, by the Miles and Huberman [1994] discussion of tight and loose designs, our approach falls between the 
two extremes. In the absence of preexisting frameworks for characterizing the information security culture of 
professionals, we have adapted previous frameworks for the information security culture of organizations to 
generate issues relevant to characterizing the information security culture of professionals. The process of 
generating the issues and the subsequent questions for the interviews is loosely guided by the adapted frameworks 
and is researcher-driven. As Miles and Huberman [1994] put it, “. . . as researchers, we do have some background 
knowledge. … We know some questions to ask, … Not to ‘lead’ with our conceptual strength can be simply self-
defeating” [p. 17]. In keeping with this theme, we use our intuition and common sense to generate the questions. 
In reviewing the issues generated, it was clear that almost all issues focused on the information security-related 
beliefs of the professional groups. So, we created a category called security-related beliefs. Only two issues did not 
fit neatly into the category of security-related beliefs: beliefs about willingness to take risks in general, and beliefs 
about professional codes. Since these two issues were quite disparate, we created two separate categories: general 
beliefs and professional identity beliefs. General beliefs include beliefs about risk and compliance, and professional 
identity beliefs subsume issues related to professional codes. There are two reasons why we have included these 
two categories in the overall conceptualization of the information security culture of professionals. First, the issues 
related to these categories are derived from prior conceptualizations of information security culture. In the interest of 
building on prior research, they should be retained in the conceptualization of the information security cultures of 
professionals.  
Second, while each of the two categories is not limited to security, they do encompass security and can inform us on 
the issue of information security culture. For instance, the unwillingness to take risks is likely to manifest in a 
tendency to comply with rules and regulations. It is reasonable to argue that groups that are risk averse are likely to 
carry over that aversion to the area of information security, and comply with rules and regulations regarding security, 
resulting in a stronger security culture in the group. 
When we consider professional codes, the codes incorporate the profession’s core values. The core values in turn 
are rooted in the profession’s perception of who they are, what their role is, and their value to organizations.  
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Table 2:  Identification of Issues for Interview Guides 
 Chia et al. [2002] Listing of preliminary issues to develop interview questions 
The nature of time and time horizon 
 Short-term vs. long-term 
perspective of security 
This relates to how organizations should view security to improve 
the information security culture in organizations. This is not 
relevant to characterizing security cultures of professional 
groups. 
Motivation 
 Are employees intrinsically 
motivated to accept security? 
 Rewards and punishment?  
This relates to how organizations should motivate employees to 
improve the information security culture in organizations. This is 
not relevant to characterizing the security cultures of professional 
groups. 
Stability versus change/innovation/ 
personal growth  
 Stability is safe; change has risks 
 Willingness to take risks 
 Willingness to take security risks  
We have split this into two: Limited it to members of profession 
(compares to employees in organization) 
 Beliefs about risks in general 
 Beliefs about security risks 
 Their propensity to take security risks under performance 
pressure 
 
Risks are generally controlled by formulating rules and 
procedures or having direct guidance from management. Beliefs 
regarding these are related to beliefs about risk: 
 Beliefs about complying with rules and procedures 
 Beliefs about organizational hierarchy and complying 
with managerial guidance 
Orientation to work, task, co-workers:  
 Employees should be made to feel 
responsible for security. 
 Is security an impediment to the 
daily operations of an employee? 
 Education of employees about 
security is important. 
 What is the role of the professional in security? 
 What conflicts exist between work and security? 
 What are sources of information about security? 
Isolation versus collaboration/cooperation  
 Every member of an organization 
should be involved in some way 
with maintaining security. 
 Security policy should be created 
collaboratively. 
 Who is responsible for information security? 
 What role does the professional group play in ensuring 
information security? 
 
Control, coordination, and responsibility 
 Balance between risk and control: 
empowerment versus enforcement 
 Alignment of organizational and 
security goals 
 Tone for security must be set from 
the top 
 Security awareness should be 
instigated right from the top 
 Need for security team 
Some issues in this category are not relevant to professions. For 
example, alignment of organizational and security goals is an 
organizational issue. 
 
Other issues lead to possible questions: 
 Beliefs about organizational hierarchy and complying 
with managerial guidance 
 Who is responsible for security? 
 
Orientation and focus  
The internal and external focus driving the 
security activities 
In organizations, there may be external forces dictating security 
behavior. This is not relevant to characterizing security cultures 
of professional groups.  
 The basis of truth and rationality 
 Importance of security? 
 What is good/bad security? 
 What is the effectiveness of 
security? 
 What  is security? 
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Table 3: Identification of Issues for Interview Guides 
 Tejay and Dhillon [2005] Listing of preliminary issues to develop interview questions 
Planning 
 Security requirements should be 
analyzed. 
This is a prescription to improve information security 
culture in organizations. It does not relate to security 
beliefs of professional groups.  
Organizational structure 
 Order of elements in an organization 
(hierarchical structure) 
 Assigns authority and responsibilities 
 Beliefs about organizational hierarchy and 
complying with managerial guidance 
 
Information security awareness 
 Awareness of security policies, 
procedures, controls; role of employee 
 Attained through education and training 
 What is security? 
 What is the importance of security? 
 Who is responsible for security? 
 What are sources of knowledge about security? 
Informal work practice 
 Daily operations of how things are done 




 Responsibility (personal accountability) 
 Authority 




Codes of conduct 
 Core value of profession 
 Role of profession 
 Contribution to organization/society 
Group cohesiveness 
 Threatening group cohesiveness will 
threaten security culture. 
This relates to improving the information security culture in 
organizations by increasing cohesiveness of working 
groups in organizations. So this is not relevant to 
characterizing security cultures of the professional context. 
 
Collectively, the core values of the profession, as well as the perception held by members of the profession of who 
they are, what their role is, and their value to the organization, reflect the beliefs about the identity of the professional 
group. It can be seen that these perceptions can shed light on security-related beliefs. For example, a group that 
sees its role as maintaining the integrity of organizations may pay more attention to security-related issues than a 
group that sees its role as improving the innovativeness of organizations.   
In sum, the issues that have been identified to help characterize information security cultures of professionals can be 
parsimoniously classified into three categories: beliefs about the identity of the profession, general beliefs about risk 
taking and compliance, and beliefs about security. Each of the issues being considered to characterize security 
culture of professional groups can be included in one of these three categories. So, no additional category is 
necessary. Our framework contains the key dimensions applicable to professional security culture from both prior 
conceptualizations.  
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Our qualitative study is based on interviews of respondents from different professions on issues identified in the 
section on theoretical framework as relevant to the characterization of information security cultures of professions. In 
this section, we elaborate on the demographics of the respondents in our study, the data collection process, and 
finally explain the analytical procedures used. 
Respondents 
Our goal was to characterize the information security cultures of different professions and compare them. We 
elected to study four professions, because that number seemed sufficiently large to afford us an opportunity to 
detect diversity in security cultures, while at the same time keeping the scope of the study to a manageable size. 
The accounting profession was chosen because its work requires compliance with specific rules and policies, such 
as those specified by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Additionally, accounting data includes confidential organizational and client information, and must therefore be 
handled securely. The human relations (HR) profession was chosen because it has the primary responsibility for 
handling confidential employee information, which is subject to various laws, such as the Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO) Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The marketing profession was chosen because of the general perception that marketers 
are relatively less likely to be concerned about information security. For example, Puhakainen and Siponen [2010] 
conducted an action research study in an organization to improve employee compliance through information 
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systems security training. In assessing the effectiveness of the training initiative, the researchers recorded “four 
issues that still needed to be addressed,” of which the first one was “The sales team [our italics] in particular still took 
advantage of the permitted exceptions to e-mail encryption” [p, 770]. Such a finding is an exemplar of the relatively 
lower level of concern about information security among marketing personnel. The information systems profession 
was chosen because of the general perception that it is responsible for information security.   
Respondents were recruited on the basis of their current full time work experience or prior full time work experience 
in their respective professions. At the time of data gathering, they were enrolled as graduate students at a large 
public university in the United States of America. Demographics of the respondent pools for each profession are 
shown in Table 4. The respondents for each profession were from different organizations. Thus, any cultural 
commonality that is identified can be attributed more to professional influences than to organizational influences. 
Table 4: Demographics of Respondents 
  IS professionals Marketing 
professionals 
HR professionals Accounting 
professionals 
No. of respondents 12 7 7 11 
Male:female ratio 4:1 5:2 1:6 3:8 
Age range (years) 23–45 21–43 24–37 22–55 
Experience (years) 2–25 1.5–20 1–14 3 months–30  
















Members of IS 
professional 
associations like 
ACM, ISSA, ISC2, 







websites and forums, 
constantly interacted 
with members of their 
profession. 




Society of Training & 
Development, and 











Data Collection  
The data collection method used in the current study was semi-structured, face-to-face interviews to elicit the beliefs 
underlying the information security culture. As we have mentioned earlier, we use the term “beliefs” broadly to refer 
to responses on values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on; based on prior research, these are usually considered 
sufficient to characterize culture. The structured questions were generated based on the issues related to the 
categories identified in the theoretical framework (see Tables 2 and 3 for issues on which interview questions are 
based). A detailed interview guide (see Appendix A) was prepared. The guide consists of questions for inclusion 
during the interview. In some cases, the issue listed in the table is already in the form of a question. In other cases, 
the issue was expanded into more than one question in the interview guide. 
The follow-up unstructured questions were aimed at eliciting clarifications, details, and richness. Responses from 
interviewees were not limited in any way. The interviews focused on identifying the following three sets of beliefs—
beliefs about their identity of the profession, general beliefs, and beliefs about information security. Respondents 
were asked questions only about their profession (e.g., accountants were asked about the beliefs of the accounting 
profession only). A sample of the questions used in the study is shown in Table 5.  
The unit of analysis for the study is the professional group level, so the respondents were asked to state their 
respective professional group’s beliefs and behaviors, not their own personal beliefs and behaviors. Toward the end 
of the interviews, respondents were allowed to also ask questions and add comments.  
The interviews were conducted over a period of three months. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. In addition 
to the transcription, additional notes were taken during the course of the interview and were also made after the 
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Table 5: Sample Questions Used in Interviews 
 Category Sample questions
2
 
Membership in profession What profession do you consider yourself to be a part of? 
To what extent do you participate in activities or groups associated with your 
profession? 
Do you attend professional group meetings, gatherings, or conferences? 
Identity: 
Core value of profession What would your profession’s members say the values of your profession 
are? 
Role of profession What do members of your profession believe is the primary role of their 
profession? 
Contribution to organization/ 
society 
If you had to describe what your profession contributes to society, what 
would you say? 
General beliefs: 
Beliefs about risks Generally speaking, how do members of your profession feel toward risk-
taking? 
Beliefs about complying with rules 
and procedures 
Among the members of your profession, what is the general belief about 
abiding by rules and procedures? 
Beliefs about organizational 
hierarchy and complying with 
managerial guidance 
Do members of your profession subscribe to the idea of hierarchy? 
What would the response of members of your profession be if upper 
management tried to specify details on how to do the task? 
Beliefs about information security: 
What is information security? Can you describe what the term “information security” or “IS security” 
means to members of your profession? 
Who is responsible for information 
security? 
Who do the members of your profession think should be responsible for 
information security? 
What role does group play in 
ensuring security? 
What role do the members of your profession think they play with respect to 
information security? 
Beliefs about taking security risks Do members of your profession believe in taking information security-related 
risks? 
Beliefs about taking security risks 
under performance pressure 
How do members of your profession handle choices/trade-offs between 
getting the job done and information security measures?  
 
It would be appropriate to mention that a pilot study with twelve respondents from diverse professions was 
conducted. Pilot studies help the researchers get familiar with the phenomenon of interest and test the questions. 
The pilot study indicated no major problem with the interview scheme. 
Analytical Procedures  
The interviews were transcribed, identifying information removed and coded. The Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) 
software Atlas.ti was used to code the transcripts. A total of thirty-nine codes were generated. A sample of the codes 
is shown in Table 6.
3
 In qualitative studies, coding is part of the analysis process—“coding is analysis” [Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 56]. Thus, the first author was the primary coder. To ensure the reliability of the coding process, 
we followed procedures used in Pare [1995]. An external coder is provided with a list of codes, an explanation of 
each code, and a sample chunk for each code. The external coder is instructed to use the list to become familiar 
with the codes. Then the external coder is provided with a test set of textual chunks from the interviews. The 
external coder and the researcher code these chunks independent of each other. Intercoder reliability is calculated 
using Holsti’s code of reliability (CR) [Holsti, 1969]. The formula for calculating the coefficient of reliability is CR = 
2M/(N1 + N2), where M = number of coding decisions on which the coders agreed, and N1 and N2 are the number 
of coding decisions made by the first and second coders, respectively. The coefficient of reliability for the test set 
was 0.83. The external coder and the researcher discussed the codes on which the two disagreed. On the basis of 
the discussion, the researcher was able to confirm his understanding of the code or correct his understanding of the 
code for further coding of the remaining transcripts. Inter-rater reliability was checked only once. It can also be seen 
that the inter-rater reliability was done for the overall coding scheme and not for individual codes. 
 
                                                     
2
 The full list of questions  is included in Appendix A. 
3
 The full set of codes with number of instances and sample segments are shown in Appendix B. 
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Table 6: Sample of Codes 
Description of individual codes Codes 
Beliefs about taking risks  Bel_Risk 
Beliefs about complying with hierarchy in organizations Bel_Comp_Hier 
Beliefs about complying with rules and procedures Bel_Comply_Rules 
Beliefs about amount of responsibility generally preferred  Bel_Pref_Responsibility 
Beliefs about taking information security risks Bel_InfoSec_Risks 
Beliefs about taking information security risks, when taking such risks could 
help them in getting their jobs done and improve their efficiency or productivity. 
Bel_InfoSec_Risk_Job_Done 
Beliefs about amount of responsibility preferred on information security issues Bel_Pref_InfoSec_Responsibility 
Beliefs about the role members of their profession play in information security 
issues in organizations 
Bel_Role_in_InfoSec 
Beli fs about who is responsible for information security issues in organization Bel_InfoSec_Responsibility_is 




Next, the process of generating a narrative is described. The software package (Atlas.ti) was used to extract clusters 
of quotes associated with one code from the interview transcripts. Sample responses for one cluster, “Who do IT 
professionals think is responsible for information security in an organization?” are shown in Table 7. Brief notes are 
made, and a summary of beliefs surfacing from the responses are noted. In Table 8, the development of a small part 
of the narrative from the summaries associated with three different codes is shown. A preliminary structure for a 
narrative fragment that could be generated from these summaries was first decided upon. Then the actual narrative 
fragment was developed. Using this process, the narrative shown in the results section was developed. 
Table 7: Sample Responses and Summary Notes for One Code 
Sample of responses and summary notes: Who do IT professionals think is responsible for information security in 
an organization? (Code: Bel_InfoSec_Responsibility_is) 
Question Response 
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for 
information security within organizations? 
P3: IT professionals  
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for 
information security within organizations? 
P4: IT professionals  
 
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for 
information security within organizations? 
P5: Everybody  
 
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for 
information security within organizations? 
P6: Themselves [IT professionals] 
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for 
information security within organizations? 
P7: CIO at the very end. But, it comes down to IT 
professionals themselves including the security staff 
and IT professionals that you have. 
Who do IT professionals think is responsible for 
information security within organizations? 
P11: The trend today is that you have an actual 
security team.  
What if they don’t have an actual one? P11: Whoever they happen to have working in IT, if 
they don’t have a security team. But, most large 
organizations have a security team.  
Notes for “Who do IT professionals think is responsible for information security within organizations?” 
Keywords/phrases Individuals mentioned: IT professionals; security 
teams; CIO; everybody. 
Summary The primary belief is that IT professionals are 
responsible for security. A couple of respondents 
believed that the security team should be responsible. 
One or two respondents stated that management or 
the CIO is ultimately responsible for security. Only 
one respondent viewed information security as 
everyone’s responsibility. 
 
The narratives generated following this systematic process are used to create segments of the descriptive 
characterization of the information security cultures of the four professions. The descriptions are presented in the 
next section on results. The empirical basis or empirical support for the descriptions are the narratives generated. 
The quotes included are exemplars to illustrate issues, and are not meant to be the sole basis on which the 
descriptions are developed.  
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Table 8: Generation of Narrative from Summaries 
  Development of narrative from summary notes for multiple codes 
Notes for “Who do IT professionals think is responsible for information security within organizations?” 
Individuals mentioned IT professionals, security teams, CIO, everybody 
Summary The primary belief is that IT professionals are responsible for security. A couple of 
respondents believed that the security team should be responsible. One or two 
respondents stated that management or the CIO is ultimately responsible for 
security. Only one respondent viewed information security  as everyone’s 
responsibility. 
Notes for “What does the term ‘information security’ mean for IT professionals?” 
Key phrases from 
responses 
Protecting data, keeping it from going public, protection from hackers. Making sure 
data is not tampered with. 
Protecting technology resources: network, infrastructure, networks, computer 
systems, and applications.  
Securing lines of transmission 
Summary IT professionals view information security as protecting data and the technology 
resources, which include: computers, networks, and applications. 
Notes for “What activities/issues do IT professionals associate with information security?” 
Keywords/phrases from 
responses 
Planning, passwords, encryption, rules and procedures, audits. 
Passwords, physical security, authorized access. 
Intrusion detection, role-based access, passwords; confidentiality, integrity, 
availability. 
Summary IT professionals associate technical issues and activities with information security, 
such as intrusion detection, passwords, encryption, and role-based access. They 
acknowledge the need for higher level managerial activities, such as planning, and 
development of rules and procedures to guide the technical activities. 
Preliminary structure for 
narrative 
IS professionals view information security as protection of information and 
information infrastructure. Activities associated with information security—
passwords, encryption, and so on, as well as planning and development of rules 
and policies. They view themselves as responsible for security.  





IS professionals view information security primarily in terms of safeguarding the 
information residing in the information technology infrastructure, which includes the 
computers, networks, and the software applications. Some of the tools that they 
associate with information security include passwords, intrusion detection systems, 
firewalls, and role-based access control systems. Thus, it would appear that they 
view information security primarily as a technical problem. This, presumably, leads 
to the belief that the IS group is and should be the group responsible for information 
security in organizations. They believe that members of other professional groups, 
such as accounting, marketing and human relations, view IS professionals as 
responsible for security, a charge that they feel capable of fulfilling. IS professionals 
further believe that while management may have the ultimate responsibility for 
security, it is the responsibility of the IS group to guide management on security 
issues, both by educating managers and by proposing security initiatives. They also 
believe that they are responsible for developing security policies and implementing 
them. Further, IS professionals believe that they are aware of security issues (i.e., 
what the dangers are and how to minimize them). 
V. RESULTS 
Our focus was on identifying and examining the security cultures of different professions. This section examines the 
identities, general beliefs, and security-related beliefs of each of the four different professional groups. This is 
followed by a brief comparison of the information security cultures of the four professional groups. The information 
security culture of a group is viewed as the security-related beliefs taken in conjunction with the group’s beliefs about 
its identity and its general beliefs about risk and compliance.  
Identities of Professions 
The identity of a professional group is its perception of itself, formed from its core values, and its perception of the 
profession’s contribution to society and organizations. In our study, the core values of the different groups have 
                                                     
4
 This narrative is part of the description of the Security Beliefs of IS Professionals in the body of the article. 
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common threads, including honesty, integrity, and service to the organization and society. However, each group’s 
perception of its role within an organization is quite distinct. The role is embodied in their belief that they bridge the 
organization and another entity, that entity being related to their special area of expertise.  
Identity of Accounting Professionals 
Accountants believe that their role is to ensure the validity and accuracy of financial statements of organizations, and 
to keep track of money and other assets in organizations. They view themselves as the bridge between principals 
(the shareholders) and agents (the managers). To quote one respondent: 
“They [accounting professionals] are the people that assure the correctness of financial statements. 
They are the people that say the financial statements are correct. They play a big role between the 
principals which are shareholders and the agents which are the managers. They are the middle 
man between them i.e. to make sure that this is your money and this is what is being done with 
your money.” 
Accountants further believe that their work contributes to the efficiency and profitability of organizations. The 
accounting and financial reports that they produce are used to assist the organizations in making decisions on 
budget allocations, predicting future performance, and ensuring compliance with regulations. Valid accounting data 
leads to good decisions, which in turn lead to efficiency and profitability. In the words of one respondent: 
“Because that [financial reports] is what all the other departments will utilize when making decisions 
about the firm, if they should invest in the project or discontinue a line.” 
Accounting professionals believe that they play an integral part in the protection of the wealth of people in society. 
When queried about the contribution that accountants make to society, one of the respondents with three decades of 
experience in the profession put it this way: 
“Sort of like ‘A guard at the door’. We [accounting professionals] offer an area of security, 
confidence to the users of the financial information. Accountants are a form of security to the users 
of financial information.” 
Accounting scandals have reinforced the belief that there is a need to uphold their core values even in the event of 
conflict with management. They believe that the emphasis on core accounting values is higher today than before the 
notable corporate accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, Worldcom) when corporate values clouded the accounting 
profession’s values of integrity and accuracy. Respondents noted that corporate accounting scandals have resulted 
in regulatory standards and penalties for not upholding the values of the profession.  
Identity of HR Professionals 
HR professionals mediate the relationship between the organization and its employees. On one hand, they believe 
they maximized the value of the organization by aligning employees with the strategic direction of the organization. 
"[the core value of HR professionals is] to achieve the strategic objectives of the organization 
through the accomplishments of people and so, the alliance would be first with strategic intent, and, 
then aligning the people vertically and horizontally with what direction the company wants to go." 
They provide support to the strategic goals of the organization by playing an active role in the recruitment, 
development, and retention of employees.  
“Developing people, celebrating their success and working with them to improve their 
shortcomings.” 
On the other hand, they view themselves as champions of the employees, ensuring equal treatment of all 
employees, and advocating for their causes, which sometimes involve standing up to management on behalf of 
employees. One HR manager said: 
“You know we always have to fight different things for employees and managers. That fight means 
bringing up the issues to the management, providing support, going outside and doing research 
and saying this is why we have to do this.” 
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While professing that the core values are very important to them, HR professionals were clear on how they would 
respond to a conflict between the values of their profession and the values of the organization. For issues related to 
legal procedures and laws, they would stand up for the values of the profession, even when doing so may entail their 
job. However, for other issues, they would concede to management. In the words of one recruiter: 
“They [HR professionals] are going to go with the values of the organization. Because, that gives 
them their bread and butter. Unless against the law that would be an exception.” 
In effect, HR professionals view themselves as the mediators between an organization and its employees, trying to 
help the organization gain the maximum from its employees, while simultaneously ensuring that employee rights and 
privileges are not ignored. 
Identity of Marketing Professionals 
Marketing professionals view themselves as the group that bridges an organization and its customers. They believe 
that they provide value by enabling organizations to understand the market and the customers, and by effectively 
disseminating information about the organizations’ products to the market. To quote one marketing research analyst 
on the issue of helping organizations understand customers, 
“They [marketing professionals] play a major role overall in the organization because, if the 
organization did not know who their customer is then they wouldn’t know what to sell.” 
Marketing professionals believe that they play the critical role of bringing information about products to those who 
need it (including organizations and consumers) and of enabling them to make informed decisions about the 
products. In the words of one of the respondents with sales and advertising experience from the pharmaceutical 
industry: 
“..it [marketing profession] brings information to consumers that otherwise may not have been 
conveyed. Because, marketing basically brings out information to those who need it about new 
products.” 
They view this role as important because they believe that society as a whole lacks the ability to pursue relevant 
information about products and services available, because of information overload. 
Thus, the marketing professionals have the identity of meeting societal needs for products by informing the 
organization of the consumer needs and the consumer of products available from the organization. 
Identity of IS Professionals 
IS professionals view information systems as a key factor in making organizations more efficient and effective. They 
view their role as helping organizations and society derive the benefits of using information technology. In this role, 
they believe that it is their charge to develop and maintain the technical infrastructure and solve user problems. The 
solutions to the complex problems associated with these tasks demand that IS professionals be innovative. Thus, 
their primary identity is that of an innovative group dedicated to the task of making society and organizations more 
efficient and effective through the use of information technology. An illustrative quote: 
“[Information Systems] Delivers the infrastructure that our culture or society has grown to depend 
upon. If you removed all the technology it will be back to Stone Age exactly. So, as a society we 
have grown to depend on the technology. The IT [information technology] professionals themselves 
are the ones that continue to develop and implement that technology. Quality of living ultimately 
depends on IT professionals who continue to keep up our quality of living.” 
While they see themselves as the primary personnel who are experts in the realm of technology, they recognize 
their role has to be relevant to organizations. In this context, they encounter conflicts between their views and that of 
other groups, either users or managers. In such situations of conflict, they are reluctant to surrender technology-
related decisions to others. They will assert their viewpoints, almost to the point of appearing recalcitrant. But they 
recognize that managers bear the ultimate responsibility for the well being of the organization. Hence, once they 
believe that the managers have heard and taken their views about technology into consideration, they will concede 
to managers. In short, when there are conflicts between the values of the IS personnel and those of the 
organization, IS personnel will ultimately fall in line with organizational values. To quote one respondent: 
“I would say that the values of the organization win over. Because its [IT professional’s] whole goal 
is to support the overall organization. So, I would say IT would have to bow down to organization.” 
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In effect, IS professionals view themselves as the technical experts who help an organization realize the benefits of 
technology. 
Summary of Identity of Professions 
The interviews indicate that members of the Accounting and HR professions are focused on control functions. 
Accountants are bound by the rules governing accounting practices, and they exert control over others by 
demanding behavioral compliance with the rules. Similarly, HR professionals are bound by rules and regulations 
from federal and state agencies, and they exert control over the other groups in the organization by demanding 
compliance with employee-related regulations. In contrast, IS and marketing professionals identify more with 
productivity responsibilities. IS professionals view their role as increasing organizational efficiency and effectiveness 
by leveraging information systems and technology. Marketing professionals view their role as facilitating two-way 
traffic between the organization and its customers, engaging in activities that increase sales and profitability.  
General Beliefs of Professions 
The general beliefs of interest to us are beliefs of professionals about risk, compliance with rules and procedures, 
and the importance or relevance of hierarchy and managerial guidance. We consider these relevant because groups 
with a proclivity toward risk-taking are also likely to take chances with security. Similarly, security safeguards are 
enhanced by formulating policies and procedures that employees must observe. A group that fails to observe rules 
and regulations, in general, may be more likely to transgress rules and regulations related to security. Finally, beliefs 
about hierarchy and managerial guidance provide a basis for expectations regarding how groups may react to 
security-related managerial initiatives. 
General Beliefs of Accounting and HR Professionals 
The general beliefs of the accounting professionals and HR professionals are very similar, so they are discussed 
together. Both professions are rooted in rules and regulations.  In the accounting profession, the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) provide the framework for preparing financial statements. Professional associations 
such as the American Accounting Association (AAA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) have published codes of ethics. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has further defined expectations of 
accounting professionals. Collectively, the internal standards, code of ethics, and laws governing accounting place a 
strong demand on accounting professionals to comply with rules and regulations.  
Accounting professional:
5
 “I think they [accounting professionals] are more and more familiar with it 
[ethics and rules]. Not to say that they were not but, it is getting more …After Sarbanes and Oxley, 
it has been really emphasized in the accounting world and the accounting profession. If you are 
really on the job, you would be really careful about things like that.” 
HR professionals are likewise bound by organizational policies, as well as federal and state regulations governing 
treatment of employees. 
HR professional: "Because a lot of the rules that are in place in HR [are] not like ‘Oh you can take a 
short cut and get away with it’. It’s like this is the rule and you know its legality." 
This need to be in compliance with laws and regulations appears to extend to other rules and procedures that may 
exist. Accountants see legal liabilities involved with taking risks, feel the need to take personal responsibility for 
actions, and believe that in the accounting profession there is much to lose by taking risks, thus making them a 
conservative group, overall. 
Accounting professional: "They [accounting professionals] are very skeptical towards taking risk 
because the underlying principle for accountants is conservatism. If you are ever skeptical about an 
event or transaction or you feel that it is a risk then you lean more towards conservatism." 
HR professionals, with a few exceptions, identified themselves as a “risk-averse group.” They attributed their risk 
aversion to the expectation of their job and profession to be compliant to various rules, regulations, and procedures, 
and the eventual risk of litigation. To cite one of the respondents: 
HR professional: "I would say that they are risk averse. Because a large part of our job is to ensure 
that the organization and employees are meeting certain regulations, certain standards set by the 
federal state local governments. So, we are in the mode of compliance. So, taking risk is kind of 
going outside of that." 
                                                     
5
 We have explicitly identified the profession of the respondent in some instances to avoid confusion. 
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Accountants further extend their risk-aversion to other beliefs that reduce organizational risk. Their work revolves 
around financial data. Accuracy of such data is critical, and thus they consider it advisable to verify work done at 
levels below them.  This is consistent with their beliefs about the need for hierarchy in organizations, which 
delineates responsibilities and allows for managerial guidance and supervision. But managerial guidance is 
expected to be consistent with professional guidelines. 
The beliefs of HR professionals on the issue of hierarchy are best reflected in the group’s view that they are the 
keepers of organizational charts.  
HR professional: "In my experience, you know, HR people are pretty quick to, you know, bring out 
the organization chart to show, you know, here is where you are and here is where your boss is and 
here is how your boss fits in to the hierarchy above you. All these organizations that I worked for 
was very hierarchical in nature. There was an emphasis of you always knowing your place in the 
machine." 
Their acceptance of a hierarchy is consistent with their willingness to comply with managerial directives. When they 
disagree with managers, they will express the disagreement, but comply when directed to do so. To cite one of the 
respondents on this issue: 
HR professional: "They are going to share their perspectives on the issue. But, at the end of the 
day they are going to do what they are told to do." 
Thus, accountants and HR professionals present a coherent picture in their beliefs related to risks, rules, and 
regulations, as well as the need for hierarchy. They believe in minimizing risk and complying with rules and 
regulations. They believe that a hierarchical structure is necessary for the orderly functioning of a system. 
General Beliefs of Marketing Professionals 
Marketing professionals present a consistent picture of a group more prone to taking risks, with a lower regard for 
rules, and a relatively lower level of concern for managerial directives. They view taking risks as important to their 
success. 
"Generally they [marketing professionals] would think that ‘There’s nothing to gain if you don’t take 
risk’ so, they are above average in terms of taking risks." 
Consistent with that, marketing professionals will circumvent rules when necessary. Marketing professionals view 
rules and procedures as guidelines rather than inflexible directives. Marketing professionals reserve the right to bend 
the rules, and do so, when the rules are time consuming, or problematic, or impede the flexibility of their work 
schedules. In the words of one of the respondents: 
"They [marketing professionals] see rules and procedures as guidelines as they can be bent a 
little… and if there is a loophole you can go through it. But, if it is not bendable or a loophole they 
will not do it." 
Marketing professionals further seem to believe that supervision and reporting requirements are not the road to 
success. 
"It [what marketing professionals expect from management] is more like ‘When there is a problem I 
will call you or ask you. In the mean time tell me I am doing a great job.’" 
Overwhelmingly, marketing professionals want very little influence from management. They believe that managers 
should provide high level guidance and allow the marketing professionals to decide on the details of how to get the 
work done.  
“You [management] do not have to tell us [marketing professionals]. [I’d] rather have you guide me 
through the process than … you tell me what to do. Unless I ask you or I do not know what … it is.”   
This belief stems from the feeling that non-marketing managers do not have adequate marketing expertise, and 
should therefore stick to what they know best (i.e., management). There is also the associated fear that managerial 
involvement will curtail the freedom necessary to get their job done. Further, they believe that influence from 
management may also skew the outcome of their work. In the words of one marketing researcher,  
“Very little [influence from management]. From [a marketer’s] perspective they are trying to produce 
data for these managers to answer, to make the decision. Sometimes they get too involved, they 
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kind of skew that data or kind of push the answer or the question to another question, when you are 
trying to work on this question.”  
Marketing professionals believe that a hands-off style of management will foster creativity and provide an 
environment where they can perform effectively. 
Overall, marketing professionals come across as willing to take chances, ignoring rules when possible, and wanting 
to assert their independence at every chance. 
General Beliefs of IS Professionals 
IS professionals present a somewhat confused picture. They believe that they are risk averse. Their risk aversion 
stems from the belief that organizations are highly dependent on information systems. Quote from a respondent: 
"IT professionals are generally averse to risk because they are charged with maintaining the 
organization’s information resources, and, they can’t afford risk because if they take a risk and 
information resources are compromised, there is no way to get it back. So, the potential loss is too 
high and they don’t want to take risk."  
This conservative view applies to the maintenance of the technical infrastructure, as well as the day-to-day 
operations of the technology. On the other hand, the frequent changes in technology present risks related to the 
choice of new technologies to adopt, and timing risks related to when to upgrade to or adopt new technologies. In 
such situations, a certain degree of risk is unavoidable.  In this case, their attitudes became: 
“They would think risk is part of IT and specifically software development. I think they believe that it 
has to be managed.” 
Given their primary belief about being risk averse, surprisingly, IS professionals are reluctant followers of rules. They 
concede the need for rules and procedures, but tend to question them frequently. In particular, they seem to believe 
that rules with respect to information systems are for others and not for themselves. 
"They [IS professionals] will be happy to make rules and procedures but, following other people’s 
rules and procedures would probably be seen by them as stupid sometimes." 
Their beliefs about managers and hierarchy are consistent with their reluctant observance of rules and regulations. 
IS professionals believe that managers should provide broad goals and facilitate access to resources. Other than 
that, they believe that IS professionals should have the freedom to accomplish tasks without micromanagement. 
Thus, IS professionals present a mixed picture. The group recognizes the criticality of the information infrastructure 
and routine processing under their charge, causing them to be risk averse. On other fronts, their beliefs reflect a 
group that wants independence, without being shackled by rules or managerial directives. 
Summary of General Beliefs of Professions 
Our analysis indicates that accounting and HR professionals are risk averse and rule compliant, and believe strongly 
in the role of hierarchy and managerial initiatives. Marketing professionals came across as almost rebellious—
believing that their success as marketers depended on their willingness to take risks, that rules can be bent when 
necessary, and that managers should help when called upon, but otherwise stay away. IS professionals are 
schizophrenic: risk averse on basic functions, but risk tolerant when it comes to new technology. They believe in the 
value of rules for others, but do not see the need to follow them themselves (“do as I say, not as I do”). They 
acknowledged the need for hierarchy, but saw a limited role for managerial directives.  
In terms of general beliefs, accountants and HR professionals are at one end of a “general beliefs” spectrum (beliefs 
about risk, compliance with rules and procedures, and the importance of hierarchy), with marketing at the other end. 
Accountants and HR professionals are conservative, compliant with rules, and desirous of an organized structure 
with clear delineation of responsibilities. Marketing professionals believe in taking risks, circumventing rules, and 
asserting their independence, all in the search for success. IS professionals fall between these two extremes, 
believing it necessary to be risk averse in discharging their duties with respect to the information infrastructure, but 
otherwise wanting to be independent of rules and managerial guidance. 
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Security-Related Beliefs 
The security-related beliefs of relevance are: what is information security, who is responsible for it, what role does 
the group play in ensuring security, what is their awareness of security issues, what is their propensity to take 
security risks in general, and what is their propensity to take security risks under performance pressure?  
Security Beliefs of Accounting Profession 
Respondents from accounting pointed out that professional associations, like the American Accounting Association 
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), provide courses, seminars, workshops, online 
self-study courses, and training on information security issues. This education may account for the fact that 
accountants have the most comprehensive view of information security. They view it as including the safeguarding 
of all the information in the organization, along with the associated information infrastructure. This encompasses 
accounting information, sales information, employee information, and so on. Infrastructure protection includes 
actions like locking server rooms, protection of physical files, and restricting access to other sensitive areas and 
material. The following quotes, first from a respondent who has worked as a staff accountant, and then from a 
respondent who has worked as an external auditor, highlight this.   
Respondent 1: “[For an accounting professional, the definition of Information Security means] 
Protection of the company’s information that is internal information. [company’s internal information 
refers to] Any of the company’s internal information, any of the accounting, all the sales data, the 
customer’s information.”  
Respondent 2: “From one standpoint it would be the information that I have gotten from my client 
that it is secured from passing on [to] somebody else. The information that I have in my company 
files is secured from passing on to anybody outside such as….” 
Consistent with this, they believed that all employees and departments shared the responsibility for information 
security in the organization. However, a few of the accounting respondents went on to state that IS professionals 
had a special responsibility to take the lead on security issues, and that accountants had a special responsibility with 
respect to accounting information. 
Accountants were fairly cognizant of information security risks. They were firm in their belief that they would not 
violate security procedures. Their mindset was to observe rules.  
"Their [accounting professionals] belief is that even the non-accounting related rules and procedures 
are still meant to protect their own work. [They would follow non-accounting rules and procedures] to 
the full extent." 
Their willingness to follow rules and their cognizance of security issues makes them unwilling to violate security 
rules, even in the pursuit of performance.  
"I think it depends on what the risk is. I think in every profession, there is cost benefit and so, I think 
you weigh the risk of breach of security with, you know, the benefit of doing it. So, would I say never 
No…I wouldn’t say we would never ever breach that. But I would say that we are fairly conservative 
about wanting to ever breach that." 
This tendency is further reinforced by the enactment of laws related to privacy and confidentiality. Certain nuances 
are worth noting. While security rules are observed, beliefs favor productivity when no rule exists. Also, while they 
have strong beliefs about observing security rules, they are not above circumventing those rules at times. 
"You took your laptop wherever you went. We had several instances reporting that the laptops were 
stolen. I took mine when I was on vacations." 
Overall, accounting professionals have a good deal of knowledge about information security issues. They are willing 
to accept responsibility for keeping information secure, and treat security tasks on par with their accounting tasks. 
The profession is based on standards and rules, and encourages a conservative mindset. The willingness to comply 
with rules aligns well with the beliefs and behaviors necessary to enhance security. Thus, the accounting profession 
presents a strong security culture oriented toward the protection of information assets in organizations. 
Security Beliefs of HR Professionals 
HR professionals indicated that their beliefs about information security come more from within the organizations that 
they work for than the profession itself. Their belief about information security is limited to the protection of 
information pertaining to employee records.  
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"For the most part it [information security for HR professionals] relates to employee management 
i.e. making sure that every aspect of [the] employee file is kept confidential and only certain 
individuals have access to various levels of information such as social security numbers, birthdays, 
marital status [and] things like that." 
In addition to their own role in keeping such information safe, they believed it was necessary to communicate to 
other employees the importance of keeping such information secure and confidential. Their awareness of 
information security risks was limited. While accepting the major responsibility for keeping employee information 
secure, almost all respondents in the study said they believed that it is the responsibility of IS professionals to 
ensure information security as a whole within organizations.  
In line with their reluctance to take risks in general as part of their job, HR professionals had strong beliefs about not 
taking information security risks. To quote a compensation analyst: 
"I do not think that they [HR professionals] would take that risk for two reasons. 1. Because of their 
code of ethics and their general way of being risk averse, and, 2. I don’t think they would know how 
to do it because, we don’t understand information technology." 
When it came to rule compliance, HR professionals did not make a distinction between general rules and 
procedures and specific rules and procedures for security. They believed it was necessary to comply with all sets of 
rules.  
"…in general I think there is a strong sense of responsibility in obligation just to follow a ll the rules 
and procedures. Because, we [HR professionals] know there is a reason for them. A lot of times we 
are enforcing a lot of reporting deadlines and rules, procedures, and, people don’t understand 
them. So, we are always having to communicate the reason why—if it’s state, federal, or local laws. 
So, there is a general awareness and kind of this tendency to comply and follow along with the 
rules." 
Their general belief in observing rules and regulations extends to their willingness to observe security rules and 
regulations. HR professionals also admitted that their lack of expertise in the area of security was part of the reason 
for their willingness to follow security rules unquestioningly. For similar reasons, they were willing to comply with 
managerial directives about security. 
"They [HR professionals] would give 100% weight [to managerial directives]. If it’s not your domain 
or you know nothing about it and if the management does, then you listen to them."  
HR professionals, similar to their accounting counterparts, are subject to privacy and confidentiality laws. This 
reinforces their tendency to comply with rules. It also inhibits any tendency to violate security under performance 
pressure. But subtle exceptions to this are acknowledged.  
"I [HR professional] have to get a notification because, [if] a kid is very badly hurt and he needs 
medical assistance then, I am not going to care about security. Those are high pressure situations 
for me that are very, very unique." 
Overall, HR professionals are a rule-compliant group, who are risk averse and follow managerial directives on all 
issues including security issues. They believe it is necessary to avoid violating security policies even under 
performance pressure except under extreme circumstances. HR professionals have strong beliefs about their role in 
and responsibility for maintaining the security of confidential information about employees. However, the same 
beliefs do not clearly extend to all aspects of security, or other types of information. In particular, while they accept 
the responsibility for the security of employee information, they believe that the responsibility for overall information 
security lies with information system professionals. HR professionals’ beliefs of information security are less holistic 
than that of the accounting professionals. But they seem to be strongly rooted in the concept of abiding by rules, 
including those related to security, even in situations of high performance pressure. Thus, it would appear that their 
contribution to the protection of information assets can be equally effective. 
Security Beliefs of Marketing Professionals 
Marketing professionals said that most of their knowledge about security came from within the organization, little 
from outside. They have a very limited perspective on information security. Marketing professionals viewed 
information security as the protection of three types of information: (1) confidential information pertaining to products 
that they market, (2) confidential information about clients for whom they market the products, and (3) information 
about customers to whom they market the products. The protection of confidential information about the products is 
considered part of their responsibility to safeguard the intellectual knowledge of the organization that they work for. 
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The protection of confidential information about clients (organizations for whom they market the product) and 
customers (individuals or organizations that buy the product) is considered necessary to maintain the trust of the 
clients and customers. As one of the respondents with experience in advertising puts it: 
“Well, in order to segment, target position or perform other marketing activities we need to know 
names, addresses or sometimes personal information if it is internal, purchasing experiences. So, 
it’s [a] lot of information that the customers would not be happy if someone else got their hands 
on….” 
They also understood that they should protect their computers (although their concept of protecting their computer 
was primarily limited to “don’t lose your laptop”) and not give out their passwords. They considered all other aspects 
of information security as the responsibility of senior management and IS professionals.  
"The IT department [is responsible for information security issues in organizations]… Because, we 
[marketing professionals] perceive ourselves being experts in duties that we perform. In the same 
line we view information security as information technology…within their domain." 
Marketing professionals do not believe in taking information security risks, in contrast to their willingness to take 
other forms of risks. This belief is rooted in the knowledge of the importance of information they possess, the 
importance of ensuring the confidentiality of that information, and the consequences of not ensuring the 
confidentiality of the information. Further, marketing professionals accept that there are issues of information 
security that they do not understand, making it more dangerous to take chances. A quote from a respondent:  
"[taking information security risks] That is different. Because, that is not like being risky on your own 
terms. That is being risky with company security and you do not want to do that. So, I probably think 
they wouldn’t be as comfortable as being risky with that kind of information."  
This translated to a willingness to observe security regulations. Once again, this willingness is primarily rooted in 
their lack of knowledge about security. 
"I think there isn’t a lot that they [marketing professionals] could do about it. I think they would be 
much more accepting. I don’t think we really have a lot of understanding about some other 
departments." 
But marketing professionals acknowledge that, under performance pressure, performance would take precedence. 
"It would be just getting the job done first of all. Because, you know information security really does 
not impact their job. It is not their [marketing professionals’] responsibility." 
Overall, marketing professionals seem to have minimal knowledge or awareness about security. They view security 
as the responsibility of others, and their only concession appears to be a willingness to observe security rules. But 
this also seems a limited willingness, based on their perspective that performance needs should take precedence 
over security.  
Security Beliefs of IS Professionals 
IS professionals receive most of their security-related knowledge from professional sources. In particular, they did 
not view either the organization or the online and print media as a useful source. These sources were considered 
reactive, and thus failed to provide relevant information in a timely manner.  In fact, IS professionals believed that 
their group educates senior management on security issues and develops security initiatives, policies, and 
procedures.  
IS professionals view information security primarily in terms of safeguarding the information residing in the 
information technology infrastructure, which includes the computers, networks, and the software applications. Some 
of the tools that they associate with information security include passwords, intrusion detection systems, firewalls, 
and role-based access control systems. Thus, it would appear that they view information security primarily as a 
technical problem. This, presumably, leads to the belief that the IS group is and should be the group responsible for 
information security in organizations. They believe that members of other professional groups, such as accounting, 
marketing, and human relations, view IS professionals as responsible for security, a charge that they feel capable of 
fulfilling. IS professionals further believe that while management may have the ultimate responsibility for security, it 
is the responsibility of the IS group to guide management on security issues, both by educating managers and by 
proposing security initiatives. They also believe that they are responsible for developing security policies and 
implementing them. Further, IS professionals believe that they are aware of security issues (i.e., what the dangers 
are and how to minimize them). 
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Consistent with their beliefs about the importance of security in organizations, they express an unwillingness to take 
security risks or violate meaningful security rules and regulations. Violations of rules have serious consequences, 
including the possibility of being dismissed from the job.  However, such attitudes toward compliance are challenged 
when the group is confronted with the need to meet productivity or performance objectives. Most of the respondents 
in our study indicated that IS professionals strongly believed that security and productivity issues could be at odds 
with each other. When the respondents were specifically asked how IS professionals handle trade-offs between 
getting the job done and information security issues, most of them said that getting the job done will come first, and 
security issues will take a back seat. The reasons IS professionals provide for the emphasis on job demands over 
security include pressure from the management to be productive, and their belief that they get paid for getting their 
job done, not for taking care of security issues within the organization.  
"I think, in the end, if they [IS professionals] had to choose between the two, they would get the job 
done. Because that’s what they get paid for, that’s their job, task and its number one." 
In sum, IS professionals exhibit an awareness of the technical aspects of information security, and claim a 
leadership role in IS information security issues. They seem willing to observe security rules because of the risks 
associated with violating them, but their stand changes when faced with the choice between security and 
performance. Thus, in spite of their belief that they have superior knowledge about security issues, they are 
vulnerable to the demands of performance. 
Summary of Information Security Beliefs 
Currently, accounting professionals express a set of beliefs that are most reflective of a strong security culture. HR 
professionals were not quite as holistic as accountants in their beliefs about what information security is, and who is 
responsible for it. Further, their awareness of security risks seemed less comprehensive than that of IS 
professionals. However, IS professionals appeared more likely to pursue productivity at the expense of security. 
Marketing professionals believed that their role in security was limited to safeguarding confidential information 
regarding customers and following security rules and regulations put in place by others. We elaborate on our 
findings further at this stage. 
The common theme that runs through the security beliefs of different professions is that the IS group is the primary 
arbiter of information security issues, which reflects a techno-centric view of security. Each profession appears to 
accept responsibility for a particular niche of information security. The groups acknowledge a role in protecting the 
core information that they handle: accountants for accounting information, HR for employee information, marketing 
for customer information, and IS for information residing in the computers and networks. The awareness of 
information security issues related to the technological infrastructure is limited in most non-IS groups, consistent with 
their belief that security is the primary responsibility of the IS group. The non-IS groups state that they will comply 
with security rules, if there is no other competing demand. Surprisingly, even the IS professionals believed that their 
professional cohorts would favor getting the job done over complying with security regulations. 
A Brief Comparison of Information Security Cultures  
Summary comparisons of the information security cultures of the four professions are shown in Tables 9 and 10 
(parts 1 and 2). The security-related beliefs of professionals taken together with their group identities and other 
relevant beliefs provide an overview of the security cultures of different professional groups. Our premise that there 
will be differences in the security cultures of different professions has been borne out. Our data suggest the 
accounting profession has a strong security culture, the marketing profession a weak security culture, with the IS 
and HR professions falling somewhere between the two.  
Accounting professionals have a holistic view of security that is consistent both with their professional identity and 
their general beliefs about rules and compliance. Their professional identity is that of a group charged with ensuring 
the accuracy of financial statements, the discharge of which requires clear procedures, and strict adherence to rules. 
Ensuring security also requires compliance with security policies, procedures and rules. Thus, compliance with 
security rules is in line with their normal propensity to comply with rules. They tend to view security as everyone’s 
responsibility, even if IS is assigned the lead role. They are aware that information security includes the protection of 
all the information in the organization and the information infrastructure. They believe strongly in complying with 
security rules. They do not believe in violations of security rules to meet performance requirements, except under 
extreme circumstances. It is clear that their security-related beliefs are in keeping with their primary culture of rule 
compliance and willingness to follow directives.  
The marketing profession’s identity is that of a group that improves an organization’s competitiveness and 
profitability by helping the customers understand the organization’s products and helping the organization 
understand the customers’ needs. Increasing sales and profitability involves a willingness to take risks to accomplish 
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Table 9: Summary Comparison of Information Security Cultures of Professions (Part 1 of 2) 
 Profession 
Category Accounting Human resources Marketing Information systems 
Identity 
Role 1 Ensure validity and 
accuracy of financial 
statements 
Help recruit 




























and profitability of 
organization 
Contribute to 







Help organization use 









are treated in 
compliance with 
the law 
Help society meet 
its consumption 
needs 
Help society use 




rules and laws 
High High Low Reluctant follower of 
rules 








technology; have to 
be willing to be 
innovative (i.e., willing 
to take risks) when 
new advances come 
Hierarchy Need to comply with 
instructions from 
higher levels 
Need to comply 
with instructions 
from higher levels 




Would like guidance 
to be limited to broad 
directions 
 
goals. The risks taken are sometimes associated with a deviation from rules and managerial directives. Thus, there 
is a general belief that rules can be ignored if the circumstances demand it. This spills over into their belief system 
about security rules and regulations. While there is a willingness to abide by security rules in normal times, there is a 
readiness to ignore them when they get in the way of fulfilling their primary responsibilities. This value system is 
consistent with their belief that they have a small role to play in information security, due to their perception that the 
primary responsibility for security belongs to management and IS professionals. Marketing professionals follow rules 
only to the extent such rules do not get in the way of their productivity or performance.  
HR and IS professionals seem to fall in between accounting and marketing professionals. HR professionals view 
their role as ensuring the equal treatment of all employees, which is tied in with the need to comply with federal and 
state statutes and rules. They believe in avoiding risks. Thus, similar to the accounting profession, their beliefs about 
complying with rules and avoiding risks in general carry over to complying with security rules and not taking risks 
with respect to security. Where they differed from the accounting profession was that they had a narrower view of 
what information security is—their beliefs restricted information security to the safeguarding of employee records. 
Also, there was a lower level of awareness of risks associated with technology. Thus, while their beliefs about 
complying with security rules strengthened security culture, their narrow definition of security and reduced 
awareness of technical issues related to security indicated vulnerabilities. 
IS professionals view their primary role as enhancing organizational efficiency and productivity through the use of 
information technology. Frequent changes in technologies require that they be willing to take risks in their pursuit of  
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Table 10: Summary Comparison of Information Security Cultures of Professions (Part 2 of 2) 
 Profession 
Category Accounting Human resources Marketing Information systems 
Security beliefs 
Source of beliefs Profession Mostly from their 
organization 
Mostly from their 
organization 
Profession 
Primary focus Accounting focus 
on accounting 
information 





Information stored in 
technology 
Who is responsible Mostly everyone; 














IS believes that 
everyone else holds 
them responsible; IS 
believes that they have 
to guide management 
on security issues; IS 
believes they have to 
come up with security 
policies 
Awareness Aware that risks 
exist 
Limited awareness Limited awareness High awareness of 
technical risk 
Security risk taking Low Low Don’t understand 
security; don’t 




Prone to comply High Willing to follow 
security rules 






to violate security 
rules 
For the most part, 
security wins; 
make exceptions 




Getting job done takes 
precedence 
 
higher efficiencies. On the other hand, they need to ensure the integrity and reliability of the technology 
infrastructure on a day-to-day basis, which leads to the belief that they should not take risks. In spite of the latter, 
overall they come across as risk takers. This applies to their beliefs about information security. So while they are 
knowledgeable about information security, they tend to believe that it is permissible to ignore security policies in 
pursuit of productivity (perhaps because they view themselves as cognizant of risks and consequences). 
Comparing the security cultures of HR professionals to IS professionals, it can be seen that HR professionals are 
less prone to take risks, more compliant with security rules and managerial directives, but have a narrower 
awareness of security issues. IS professionals, on the other hand, are more aware of security issues, but more 
prone to take risks and circumvent security rules. 
 
Overall, while professional groups may share individual characteristics of security culture, the aggregate security 
culture of each professional group appears to be relatively unique. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Based on the preceding analysis of the data gleaned from our interviews, and an understanding of the literature that 
is available, we have developed a set of propositions to illuminate the interplay and interrelationships between 
differentiated professional cultures and security cultures, including inconsistencies between culturally related beliefs 
and subsequent behavior under conditions of performance pressure. In the absence of hypotheses to confirm or 
disconfirm, these propositions constitute part of the contributions of this research. In addition, these propositions 
also provide direction for future research.  
The Conceptualization of Security Culture 
Our proposed theoretical framework is that security culture is a composite of the three dimensions: beliefs about the 
identity of the profession, general beliefs about risk and compliance, and security-related beliefs (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Conceptualization of Information Security Culture 
 
Thus, our work provides a parsimonious set of dimensions to characterize information security cultures of 
professional groups. As discussed in the section on Theoretical Framework, the three dimensions are derived from 
the frameworks proposed by Chia et al. [2002] and Tejay and Dhillon [2005]. The results in the current study show a 
consistency between the three categories of beliefs: beliefs about identity, beliefs about rule compliance, and beliefs 
about security. The idea that factors that influence behaviors in non-security domains can influence security-related 
behaviors has been suggested by others. For instance, Bulgurcu et al. [2010] argue that the motivation to follow 
rules and regulations in general can be extended to “expect that similar motivations exist in the context of ISP 
(Information Security Policy) compliance” [p. 526].  Thus, in understanding the security culture of a group it is 
worthwhile to simultaneously examine the group’s identity and other related beliefs. This leads to Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: The information security culture of a profession is rooted in its beliefs about its 
identity, its general beliefs about risk and compliance, and its security-related beliefs.  
This is important because it points out that cultural characteristics of professions outside the immediate realm of 
security can also help inform on the information security cultures of professions. In particular, the identity of the 
profession and the general beliefs about risk and compliance are useful in understanding the security cultures of 
professional groups. 
Security Cultures of Professions 
Research on security culture to date has focused on conceptualizing security culture: that is, defining the term and 
identifying dimensions [Chia et al., 2002; Tejay and Dhillon, 2005], or describing security cultures at an 
organizational level [e.g., Ruighaver et al., 2007]. There is no prior study definitively reporting differences in security 
cultures across professions, although it has been suggested that IS security has different meanings for different 
occupational communities [Vaast, 2007]. The Vaast study was conducted in a hospital, and examined the views of 
doctors, nurses, clerical staff, technicians, managers, and so on. Further, Zakaria and Gani [2003] have shown that 
managerial perceptions of security are different from end-user perspectives of security, and Smith et al. [2010] also 
indicate differences between managerial and employee perceptions of information security. The professional culture 
literature reports that there can be major differences in cultures across professions [Trice, 1993; Mills and 
Tsamenyeni, 2000]. Thus, differences in security cultures across professions should not be surprising. The current 
study has found support for the existence of differences in security cultures across professions. Thus, it can be 
proposed: 
Proposition 2: Information security cultures vary across professions. 
This result is significant because the study provides preliminary empirical evidence for differences in security 
cultures across professions. The additional contribution is that, for these four professions, the information security 
culture has been characterized. It can form the basis of understanding what lapses in security behavior may occur in 
each group, and appropriate steps taken to avoid them. 
Action Inconsistency 
 In the discussion of differentiated cultures, action inconsistency has been defined as the differences that exist 
between beliefs and behaviors in a culture [Martin, 1992]. Differences between beliefs and behaviors have been 
reported by others. Smith et al. [2010] report that senior managers, while implementing a security compliance 
program, failed to allocate adequate financial resources for the initiative. Similarly, Puhakainen and Siponen [2010] 
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report that the CEO in their study, while arranging for security training for his employees, was perceived to be slack 
in complying with the company’s information security policies. These two examples show that while management 
believed security to be important enough to implement security initiatives, their behaviors were not consistent with 
those beliefs. Similarly at the employee level, behavior has been reported to deviate from beliefs: “… four employees 
felt that work overload, hurrying, suddenly emerging situations and unplanned assignments hindered their 
compliance with the email policy” [Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010, p. 767].  
The possible existence of similar inconsistencies between security-related beliefs and security-related actions has 
been identified in the current study. Interviews examining self-reported beliefs and behaviors are likely to suffer from 
social demand bias in the answers of the respondents. It would be inappropriate for respondents to indicate that they 
believed that security was unimportant, or that they would violate security rules. Further, they would tend to be 
discreet about any security violations that they may have engaged in or observed. Either in keeping with these, or 
responding truthfully, respondents belonging to all professions said that they believed that security rules should not 
be violated. However, under conditions of performance pressure, all groups appeared to believe, to a lesser or 
greater extent, that security rules may have to be ignored. Accounting and HR professionals try to incorporate 
security procedures into their normal work-routine, but still admitted that they were prone to occasional 
circumventing of security rules under pressure to complete tasks. IS and marketing professionals readily admitted 
their bias to productivity-related objectives over security expectations. Thus, there are differences between stated 
beliefs that security rules should not be violated, and actual practices of circumventing security rules under 
performance pressure. This leads to:  
Proposition 3a: There may be inconsistencies between security-related beliefs and security-related 
behaviors, particularly at times of performance pressure. 
The conflict between security and productivity poses one of the biggest challenges. The interesting point to note is 
that even the more conservative and rule-compliant groups, such as accounting and human resources, confess to 
the circumvention of security at times of performance pressure.  
Functional Orientation of Professions 
The categorization of functions in organizations has received scattered attention in management literature. 
Additionally, the categories and their definitions are not consistent across studies. We use the categorizations 
suggested by Thompson [1965] to categorize professions by their primary functions. Thompson (1965) states that 
conditions within a bureaucracy are determined by a drive for productivity and control. Productivity refers to the 
maximization of the goal(s) as set by the owner(s) of the organization. Control refers to the processes in place to 
achieve reliable and predictable behaviors. Based on these definitions, marketing and information systems can be 
seen to be predominantly production functions, and human resources and accounting to be predominantly control 
functions. Marketing is aimed at maximizing sales; information systems is aimed at using technology to maximize 
the efficiency of diverse functions as sales, production (manufacturing), record keeping, and so on. In contrast, 
human resources is focused on controlling processes to ensure consistent application of rules and compliance with 
governmental regulations across employees (i.e., achieve reliable and predictable behaviors in these areas). 
Similarly, the accounting function controls financial record keeping (i.e., applies GAAP rules to produce reliable and 
predictable records of financial performance). 
Previous studies have not examined differences in security-related behaviors across professions. In the current 
study, we note that the two groups (accounting and HR) with a primary focus on control functions show a greater 
tendency to comply with rules and security than the two (marketing and information systems) with a primary focus on 
productivity, effectiveness, and efficiency, even under performance pressure.  
Proposition 3b: Production-oriented groups are more likely to have inconsistencies between 
security-related beliefs and security-related behaviors than control-oriented groups.  
This proposition is important because it provides generalizable guidance on which groups are more likely to deviate 
from security-related behaviors. Further, there is the possibility that the pressures from production-oriented groups 
can spill over to other related groups. This is evident from the complaint of one respondent in the Puhakainen and 
Siponen [2010] study: “Sometimes management and salesmen give us unusual, unplanned and urgent 
assignments. This makes us too busy even to think about IS security --…” [p. 767]. 
The Techno-centric View of Information Security 
 Our results indicate the IS group is seen as a key player, if not the key player, in security initiatives. This reflects a 
techno-centric view of security. Accounting professionals appear to have a more holistic perspective of security, 
acknowledging the security responsibilities of all individuals, but still seeing a significant role for the IS group. 
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Researchers have emphasized the dangers of viewing security as a technical problem [Dhillon, 1997; Siponen, 
2000].  Other researchers have determined that managers also tend to view information security as a technical issue 
that is the responsibility of IS professionals [Guzman et al., 2004]. The tendency of management to view information 
security as the responsibility of IT is also reported by Smith et al. [2010]. Interestingly, Vaast [2007] reported that IS 
professionals in a hospital setting viewed information security as a technical problem. Thus, the efforts of information 
security researchers to disseminate the idea that information security is a complex combination of technical, 
managerial, and behavioral issues have yet to bear fruit, as expressed in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4: Information security cultures of all professions continue to be rooted in a techno-
centric view of security.  
The pervasiveness of this belief is surprising given that most security professionals have been preaching that 
information security should not be viewed as a technical problem alone, and should be addressed holistically (i.e., 
with behavioral, organizational, and technical controls). The greatest danger could occur when they see the 
responsibility for information security as belonging to others, and professional groups (primarily IS) fail to see their 
own responsibilities. Such misperceptions of professional groups may be further aggravated when top management 
also has a techno-centric view of information security. 
Security Awareness 
Information security awareness plays a crucial role in effective interpretation and use of information security policies, 
procedures, and technologies by the end-users [Siponen, 2000]. In our study, the HR professionals did not claim 
security awareness, but were willing to follow security rules, with few exceptions. IS professionals, on the other 
hand, claimed a sufficiently high awareness level to stake a leadership role in security, but admitted a bias toward 
performance over security under pressure. IS professionals also did not believe strongly in complying with the rules.  
This comparison of HR and IS professions suggests that while security awareness is important, it could prove of little 
value unless it is accompanied by a strong willingness to comply with rules. This results in Proposition 5. 
Proposition 5: Security awareness is a necessary but not sufficient condition to build a strong 
information security culture. 
This proposition challenges one line of thinking currently present in the area of security (i.e., that security awareness 
is the key to improving information security) [Albrechtsen, 2007; Siponen, 2000]. It is true that security awareness is 
necessary, but our research suggests that that is not sufficient. Puhakainen and Siponen [2010] made similar 
observations. They report in their study that despite “a high level of employee awareness of IS security issues …. 
the IS security manager saw violations of information security policies and procedures, especially the e-mail policy.” 
[p. 765].  We argue that culturally, the group has to be willing to engage, and translate that awareness into action to 
result in a strong information security culture. 
Contributions and Implications 
The contributions of the study, along with the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, are discussed 
next. First, we have proposed a framework to conceptualize the security culture of a profession based on the 
identity, the general beliefs, and the security-related beliefs of the professional members. In line with this framework 
we have logically developed and provided a preliminary qualitative empirical basis for a set of propositions to inform 
and guide future research. There is consistency in the beliefs related to the three categories. Both theoretically and 
practically, this implies that a cogent understanding of the security culture of a profession can be greatly enhanced 
by simultaneously examining the three sets of beliefs. 
Second, our study suggests that while there are overlaps between the security cultures of different professions, 
there are also differences. The existence of differences may not be surprising. However, the finding is important for 
two reasons. One, in an organization, employees are influenced both by organizational and professional cultures 
[Trice, 1993]. Thus, in attempting to establish a strong security culture in an organization, managers must 
understand the influences of the professional security culture, and either leverage or compensate that influence 
based on whether the professional influence is beneficial or not. While this may seem obvious, none of the published 
literature [e.g., Leach, 2003; Tejay and Dhillon, 2005; Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004] on the development of 
information security culture in organizations recommends customized approaches for different groups in an 
organization. Two, the identification of specific differences in information security cultures between professions will 
be helpful in the formulation of customized approaches for different professions. For example, accounting groups are 
more risk averse while marketing groups are less risk averse. Thus, it is more necessary to help the marketing group 
internalize the idea that taking risks in marketing is different from taking security-related risks. 
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Third, during times when task demands increase performance pressure, there appears to be a greater willingness to 
circumvent security if it presents barriers to the efficient execution of the tasks. Our study indicates that the 
readiness with which a professional group surrenders security in favor of productivity varies across groups. 
Production-oriented professional groups (such as marketing and IS) seem to be more willing to favor productivity 
over security than control-oriented professional groups (such as accounting and HR) in our study. There is the 
potential to develop theoretical explanations why this is so, which we will leave to future research. From a practical 
perspective, the implication is to seek ways to reduce the conflict between productivity and security. In today’s 
corporate environments, where the constant refrain is “do more with less,” management may wish to step back and 
examine the effects that this perennial focus on productivity has on security. Alternatively, in a security-conscious 
organization, management may wish to focus more education and monitoring efforts on those groups that exhibit a 
tendency to favor productivity over security. 
Fourth, our study suggests that while all professional groups acknowledge some responsibility for information 
security, there is a near unanimous belief that information security is the bailiwick of IS professionals. This is 
consistent with a techno-centric view of information security, and in contrast to a growing belief among most 
researchers and many practitioners that information security is everyone’s responsibility. From an academic 
perspective, this highlights a disconnect in the IS literature between the theoretical and prescriptive 
acknowledgement that information security is a socio-organizational issue [e.g., Von Solms, 2006] and empirical 
findings that "information security research has primarily focused on technical issues" [Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen, 2007, p. 73]. From a practitioner perspective, this highlights an opportunity to improve information 
security by recognizing that although human behavior is a significant problem in implementing effective information 
security practices [Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007], group members are often unaware of this, and think that a 
combination of technology and the IS function is sufficient to safeguard organizational information assets. Focused 
outreach initiatives might educate individuals on this issue and make them more aware of their own security 
responsibilities. 
Lastly, in comparing the security awareness and beliefs about compliance of the HR and IS groups, there can be a 
disassociation between awareness and compliance. We have noted that IS professionals are more aware of 
security, but show a greater willingness to deviate from security rules, while HR professionals who are less aware of 
security risks are more willing to comply with the security rules. Thus, it is possible for a group to have high 
awareness of security issues, but to be willing to deviate from security policies. Conversely, another group may have 
low awareness but be less willing to deviate from security policies. From a theoretical standpoint, it raises the issue 
of which of the two forces leads to greater information security, and under what circumstances. From a practical 
point of view, security training must focus both on increasing awareness and encouraging compliance.  
Limitations and Further Research 
Prior to our research, there was no well established conceptualization of information security culture for professional 
groups; what was available were only two proposed conceptualizations with some preliminary validation for 
organizational security culture. We have adapted the existing frameworks to characterize the information security 
cultures of professional groups, and provided qualitative evidence to support our conceptualization. 
Our study is subject to all the limitations of studies that use qualitative techniques. Qualitative studies have limited 
generalizability. Generalizability is best established by conducting large scale surveys. Thus, future research will 
have to focus on large scale surveys to test the robustness of our results. A second limitation is that the respondents 
were all from one part of the United States. Thus, care must be taken when generalizing the results to groups in 
other parts of the United States or other parts of the world. Future research will have to replicate the study and 
conduct more surveys to expand the generalizability to professional groups in other geographical areas.  
The research agenda surfacing from the current study is presented next along with suggestions for future steps.  
First, we have examined information security cultures independent of organizations (i.e., respondents worked in 
different organizations). It would be interesting to examine whether the observed differences persist across 
professional groups working in a single organization. Trice [1993] reports that cultures of professional groups in 
organizations are subject to the influences of the culture of the professional group and the culture of the 
organization. Thus, it could be anticipated that the information security culture of professional groups in 
organizations will show the influences of the security cultures of the professions and that of the organization. At the 
level of probing for differences in security cultures across professions within an organization, a study parallel to the 
current study using interviews can be conducted. At a more complex level of identifying the relative influences of the 
profession and the organization, it would require the study of two professions (one stronger in security culture [e.g., 
accounting], and one weaker in security culture, perhaps marketing) in two organizations that have reportedly 
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Second, the primary goal of all security-related research is to help identify factors that will promote information 
security. The belief that security culture will enhance information security is based in demonstrated relationships 
between culture and performance in other areas such as organizational excellence. Comparable evidence for the 
area of information security culture needs to be gathered at two levels. The first level of study would examine the 
influence of culture on the compliance behavior of employees and the reduction in vulnerabilities. Such studies can 
be either in-depth case studies of organizations with varying strengths of security cultures, or surveys using self-
report data from key respondents in organizations. The second level of study would examine the relationship 
between security culture and the actual incidence of security breaches. Such a study is probably best approached 
using survey methodology using key respondents from organizations. 
Third, another challenge for researchers is to develop profession-specific techniques to improve information security 
cultures. Several researchers have put forth generic proposals for improving information security cultures in 
organizations [e.g., Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004]. More targeted approaches are necessary. Generic 
profession-independent proposals include the formulation of clear policies and procedures, awareness and 
education programs, and the implementation of rewards systems. Targeted profession-specific proposals would 
require differential emphasis on these factors based on the profession. For instance, marketing professionals have 
lower levels of awareness than other professionals. Security culture development for the marketing group should 
include a heavy emphasis on increasing awareness. In contrast, IS professionals have a high level of awareness to 
begin with, but come across as overconfident in their ability to be secure. For the IS group, improving awareness will 
need less emphasis than the issue of not being overconfident. In effect, an understanding of the differences in 
security culture across professions can help tailor efforts to improve the security culture of each profession. Studies 
requiring observations of change in cultures are necessarily longitudinal studies extending over periods of years. 
Cultures are embedded deeply, and are not likely to change in the short span of a year or two. Thus, efforts to study 
the effectiveness of approaches to change culture present the greatest challenges in terms of patience, time, and 
resources. Essentially, such studies need pre- and post-treatment measures of security cultures, in one or more 
organizations, to assess the effectiveness of the treatments. 
The fourth and final suggestion relates to the observation in our study that even groups that are aware of information 
security issues do deviate from recommended information security practices. This points to the need to understand 
why such deviations from good practices are engaged in. The deviations range from simple ones at a low level (e.g., 
sharing passwords with others to expedite work), to more complex ones, in which top management makes 
simultaneous demands of productivity and security without allocating sufficient resources to achieve both goals. 
Research would have to focus on identifying the complete range of the deviations based on observations, 
interviews, and surveys, and then classifying them into a parsimonious set. Subsequently, efforts will have to focus 
on finding ways to reduce the deviations. The specific research projects would depend on the nature of the 
deviations. Simple deviations at the individual level will need to conduct survey-based studies to elicit the role of 
individual characteristics, task-based variables, and organizational level constraints. Study of deviations at a more 
complex level, such as budget allocation issues, would need surveys to understand the demands on top 
management.  
In sum, the work in the area of information security culture has just begun. Clearly, much work remains to be done. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In an organizational setting, employee behaviors are subject to the influences of organizational culture and 
professional culture. Based on this, it is necessary to gain an understanding of professional culture to understand 
employee behaviors in organizations. In the current study, we focused on developing a characterization of 
information security cultures of four different professions. We have provided preliminary evidence that there are 
differences in the security cultures across the professions. Based on these and other findings, we have put forth 
propositions related to information security cultures of professions. In essence, the results of the study support our 
argument that the security cultures of different professions need to be examined more closely as a part of the field’s 
attempts to improve the security culture in organizations.  
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
This is (interviewer name) interviewing _(respondent name)_ on __(date)______. 
 For the record, can you give your consent for audio taping the interview for research purposes? 
 Some of the following questions may be very obvious, but I have to ask those questions for the sake of 
completeness.  
Work Experience 
 Can you briefly explain your work experience (including profile of the organization, department, the 
responsibilities of the department, and responsibilities of the job)? 
Questions Tapping Professionally Based Beliefs 
Extent of Association with Profession 
 What profession do you consider yourself to be a part of? 
 Do you have any professional certifications (Example certifications with IS profession like MCSE, MCSP, 
CCNP)? – [ WILL CUSTOMIZE THE CERTIFICATIONS DEPENDING ON THE PROFESSION/DISCIPLINE 
OF THE RESPONDENT] 
a. If yes, which ones? 
 To what extent do you participate in activities or groups associated with your profession? 
 Are you a member of any professional associations? (Example: ACM, IEEE for IS)? – [WILL CUSTOMIZE 
THE PROFESSIONAL DEPENDING ON THE PROFESSION/DISCIPLINE OF THE RESPONDENT] 
a. If yes, which ones? 
 Do you attend professional group meetings, gatherings, or conferences? 
o How often do you attend these meetings, gatherings, or conferences? 
o Have you attended national meetings? 
o Are you currently or have you previously been an office bearer of professional bodies associated 
with your profession?  
 Do you regularly visit any professionally oriented websites or listservs? 
a. If yes, which ones? 
 Do you subscribe to any industry trade magazines or journals? (Example: PC Magazine, Computers and 
Security, IEEE Spectrum, Communications of the ACM, IEEE Computer for IS Professionals)? [WILL 
CUSTOMIZE THE MAGAZINES DEPENDING UPON THE PROFESSION OF THE RESPONDENT] 
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 Do you interact with members of your profession away from work? 
a. Is this interaction primarily with co-workers or with people from other firms? * 
 If the respondent answered YES for the previous question* then ask the following: Please answer the 
following questions based on your perception of what your profession expects from you. Your answers 
should be based on what you have read in trade magazines, heard in professional meetings, and think other 
professional members in general believe. 
b. If the respondent has answered NO for the previous question* then ask the following: Please 
answer the following questions based on your perception of what members of your profession inside 
your organization believe, and which you think could be applicable to members of your profession in 
general (including outside the organization).  
 Do the professional societies you are associated with have a formal code of ethics?  
o How familiar are you with the code of ethics? 
o How familiar do you think others are with it? 
 Generally speaking, how do members of your profession feel toward risk-taking? 
 Are members of your profession optimistic or pessimistic, in general?  
 Can you describe what the term “information security” or “IS security or computer security” means to 
members of your profession? 
 In your opinion, do members of your profession believe in taking information security-related risks to get a 
job done?  
 To what extent do members of your profession seek validation of their actions from their professional peers:  
o External to their organizations? 
o Internal to their organizations? 
 Expectations toward complying with hierarchy, rules, and procedures 
o Do members of your profession subscribe to the idea of hierarchy? 
o If yes, do members of your profession like subscribing to the idea of hierarchy?  
o What is the belief of members of your profession about appropriate styles of management?  
o What is their belief about the level of detail that a manager should get involved in? 
o Among the members of your profession, what is the general belief about abiding by rules and 
procedures?  
o What is the belief of the members of your profession on the extent to which people should abide by 
rules and procedures? 
 Loyalty 
o Are they loyal to the profession?  
 What would your profession’s members say the values of your profession are? 
 To what extent do members of your profession believe in the values of the profession? 
 Would members work on upholding it whatever it takes? 
In case of conflict between the values of the profession and the values of the organization, what would happen? 
 Responsibility/Accountability Factors 
o When it comes to decisions, what level of guidance do members of your profession need from upper 
management? 
o What would be the response of members of your profession if upper management tried to specify 
details on how to do the task? 
o What would their response be if upper management tried to specify details of actions outside the 
domain of your profession (e.g., Security)? 
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o What would their response be if upper management entrusts responsibility to members of your 
profession in doing any task? 
 Will that have any effect on their beliefs/actions (in regards to the task in hand)? 
 Expectations About the Need for Rewards  
o What motivates the members of your profession? 
o How do tangible rewards (such as money, promotion) compare to intangible rewards (such as 
satisfaction and appreciation of professional peers)? 
Security-Related Issues 
 Who do the members of your profession think is responsible for information security within organizations 
they work in? 
 Who do the members of your profession think should be responsible for information security within 
organizations they work in? 
 What role do the members of your profession think they play with respect to information security in an 
organization? 
 Do members of your profession view information security as a serious problem for organizations? 
o Why? 
 Does your professional association have continuing education about IS-related security? 
o Like what? (E.g.., training sessions/workshops on security organized by professional groups) 
 Do members of your profession take IS courses as part of their education? 
 Do members of your profession take IS security-related courses as part of their education? 
Productivity Issues  
 How do members of your profession define productivity? 
 What do members of your profession believe is the primary role of their profession in an organization? 
 How does this contribute to the overall performance of the organization? 
 Does the professional organization arrange for continuing education on improving the performances? 
 Do members of your professional association take part in continuing education on performance-related 
issues? 
 How do members of your profession handle choices/trade-offs between getting the job done and information 
security measures?  
 What kind of a connection do members of your profession see between “activities to secure information” and 
“activities to be done to be productive”? 
Professional Attributes 
 If you had to describe the “culture” of your profession, how would you describe it? 
 If you had to describe what your profession contributes to society, what would you say? 
 Who influences the security-related beliefs of the members of your profession?—the profession, each 
individual’s organizational management? 
If the Respondents Are IT Professionals Then Ask the Following Additional Questions 
Influence of members of the IT professional group within organizations on security-related beliefs of members of 
other professional groups within organizations  
 What is the level of interaction IT professionals have with members of other professional groups within 
organizations? 
 Do you think that the information security-related beliefs of IT professionals tend to influence the security-
related beliefs of members of other professions within organizations? 
o If the respondent answered YES,  
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 Why do you think IT professionals influence the security-related beliefs of members of other 
professions within organizations? 
 How do you think members of the IT profession are influencing the security-related beliefs 
of other professionals within organizations? 
o If the respondent answered NO, 
 Why do you think IT professionals do not influence the security-related beliefs of members 
of other professions within organizations? 
 How do you think members of the IT profession can do better to influence the security-
related beliefs of other professionals within organizations? 
 Do you think IT professionals in general influence security initiatives within organizations (set the tone for it) 
or follow what management has planned? 
o What makes you think so? 
APPENDIX B:  SAMPLE CODES 
Table B–1: Sample Codes 
Definition # of 
instances 
Sample 
Beliefs about the need 
for validation of their 
action by others 
including their peers 
37 Interviewer: To what extent do IT professionals seek validation of their 
actions from other people including peers? 
Respondent: I think they seek it out frequently.  
Interviewer: Why do they seek it out?  
Respondent: On the personal level, you know, for egos. I think individuals 
like to be special technology professionals. Again, the personalities that 
wind up in our particular area like those challenges but, at the same time, 
they solve those challenges. Also, you know they like to represent it. I think 
from a personal standpoint from human nature they just like to.  
Beliefs about hierarchy 
and complying with 
hierarchy in 
organizations 
38 Interviewer: Do HR professionals subscribe to the idea of hierarchy in 
organizations? 
Respondent: Yes. It allows that validation that we just talked about. They 
are very big on hierarchy. There is the vice president of HR, and there is 
the HR director, HR manager, then HR representative. Only as you get to 
certain levels are you given access to more information and ability to make 
more and more substantial decisions.   
Belief about information 
security rules and 
procedures, and the 
need to comply with 
them 
24 Interviewer: What do they believe about following security rules and 
procedures?  
Respondent: If you are talking about IT security staff, they tend to put 
themselves above them.  
Interviewer: I am talking about information security.  
Respondent: I think they tend to put the rules in place and then don’t think 
they apply to themselves.  
Interviewer: Why do they think that it does not apply to them?  
Respondent: Because they are ones that created it. They want to control it.  
Belief about rules and 
procedures, and the 
need to comply with 
them 
51 Interviewer: Among HR professionals, what is the belief about abiding to 
rules and procedures?  
Respondent: It is very important that you must abide by the rules and 
procedures.   
Interviewer: What is the extent to which they would follow these rules and 
procedures?  
Respondent: I would say very strong again. If it’s a tactical action, they will 
not abide by as much because there probably aren’t any functional aspects 
on that. But, for strategic action they would.    
General belief about 
ethics 
28 Interviewer: Does the professional society that you are associated with 
have a formal code of ethics?  
Respondent: Yes. We have several courses.  
Belief about familiarity 
with the ethical 
standards 
27 Interviewer: How familiar are others with the code of ethics?  
Respondent: Strongly familiar, because you go through training for that.   
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Table B–1: Sample Codes – Continued 
Professionals’ familiarity 
of information security 
issues 
11 Interviewer: How familiar do you think HR professionals are with information 
security issues?  
Respondent: I would say that their understanding is relatively general.  
General in the sense they know what they are told to do by their 
management. I don’t think most people know the broader scope of U.S. law 
or Texas law for that matter. I have heard a lot of people say that they don’t 
know the difference between company policy and the U.S. or state policy.  
Beliefs about whether 
information security is a 
cause for concern in 
organizations 
38 Interviewer: Do members of your profession [marketing] view IS security as 
a serious problem for the organization?  
Respondent: Yes, but they ignore it.  
Interviewer: Why do they think it is a serious problem?  
Respondent: If you are designing a system for security, it comes with more 
cost and is difficult to set up… that’s the reason. 
Beliefs about the 
connection between 
information security and 
productivity issues 
36 Interviewer: How do HR professionals handle choices of trade-off between 
getting a job done and securing information?  
Respondent: I would say 5 or 10 years ago it would be like just get it done. 
It does not matter if you have to break into that system. Today it’s a 
different game. People might slide a little bit on keeping passwords real 
crazy and that kind of thing. But, the trade-off wouldn’t be acting as a 
trouble for the whole system.  
Beliefs about who has 
responsibility for 
information security in 
organizations 
39 Interviewer: Who do members of your profession [marketing] think is 
responsible for information security within the organization they work for?  
Respondent: The computer information officer or the IT people.    
Beliefs about who 
should have 
responsibility for  
information security in 
organizations 
36 Interviewer: Who do members of your profession think should be 
responsible for IS security within the organization they are working for? 
Respondent: I would say the CIO again, but maybe with more input from 
the HR management team.  
Beliefs toward taking 
information security risk 
16 Interviewer: How do accounting professionals feel toward taking information 
security risk?  
Respondent: I think it depends on the level of information that you have 
access to.  
Interviewer: What do you mean by that? 
Respondent: For example—I give you a live system or a system that has 
historical data. The company that I currently work for had just acquired 
another company and we would never share passwords for the actual 
accounting system, but we had access to historical data for research 
purposes in the other accounting system that they were using and we 
shared passwords for that. But, it was a dead system. We could not make 
entries or change anything. It was strictly read only.   
Beliefs toward taking 
information security risks 
to get a job done 
33 Interviewer: How do marketing professionals feel toward taking information 
security risks to get a job done?  
Respondent: They might bend the rules.  
Interviewer: Why?  
Respondent: Because, as far as I am concerned, in my area sometimes 
you have to take risks to get the information that you need. 
Beliefs about what 
motivates the 
professionals 
37 Interviewer: What motivates HR professionals?  
Respondent: Being acknowledged as a credible legitimate partner. Not 
being held responsible for problems outside the control of an HR person. 
An example of that would be—I am trying to get this young kid stationed in 
Florida because his mom and dad are both dying there and there is a 
special situation that requires that. Well, that is not enough of an action in 
order to move a kid to Florida. We have systems where you say we have to 
work within these rules and you have to follow them.  
Beliefs about the level of 
responsibility that pro-
fessionals prefer for in-
formation security issues 
15 Interviewer: What kind of responsibility would they [marketing professionals] 
prefer for doing tasks related to information security?  
Respondent: I would say full responsibility and be treated like an adult.   
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Table B–1: Sample Codes – Continued 
Beliefs about the 
preference of the level of 
guidance needed from 
management 
37 Interviewer: When it comes to making decisions, what level of guidance do 
IT professionals need from upper management? 
Respondent: I don’t think they need guidance as much as they just need 
enabling. Give me the resources and equipment, time, and the money to do 
the things that I need to do.  
Belief about the level of 
influence that the 
professionals want the 
manager to exercise 
35 Interviewer: What is the belief about the level of detail that a manager 
should get involved in?  
Respondent: Lots of it depends upon subordinates and the subordinates’ 
ability and skill level, their experience. When I first started as a salesperson, 
my boss would always help me with the sales call. Then later, whenever my 
boss wanted to come with me I was always wondering why? So, at the 
beginning whenever I needed help I was very happy to have it.  
Interviewer: But, in general, what is the belief?  
Respondent: Autonomy is very big for salespeople.  
Belief about the style of 
management that would 
be preferred by 
professionals 
38 Interviewer: What style of management do marketing professionals 
generally prefer?  
Respondent: They kind of prefer decentralized. I mean, they just like to 
have an open management style. 




31 Interviewer: When it comes to doing any task, what level of responsibility do 
IT professionals need or want management to entrust to them?  
Respondent: They want to rely on shared responsibility in case there is a 
problem that comes on the line that is caused by the misinformation on the 
requiring data.  
Belief about the primary 
role that professionals 
play in organizations 
37 Interviewer: What do HR professionals believe is the primary role their 
profession plays in organizations?   
Respondent: Several roles; for example, we are advocates and leaders 
because we represent employee issues and concerns, as well as 
organizational issues and concerns. We have to be good communicators.  
We have to be masters of the business. We have to understand what our 
company does. We should also facilitate change. We have to always 
promote and facilitate change.  
Belief about how the 
primary role that 
professionals play in the 
organization contributes 
to the overall 
performance of the 
organization 
36 Interviewer: How does this [the role of the profession] contribute to the 
overall performance of the organization?  
Respondent:  I think people are the most important part of the company. If 
you have a work force that is motivated or relatively satisfying, you know 
you are going to realize benefits in terms of the profitability of the company.  
Beliefs about the relative 
importance of  tangible 
and intangible rewards 
for the professionals 
37 Interviewer: How do tangible rewards such as money or promotions 
compare to intangible rewards such as enjoyability and challenge, which 
they supposedly should be seeking?  
Respondent: I think the majority of IT professionals are in the profession 
because they believe that it pays better than the other. But, there are other 
IT professionals who will enjoy the relative popularity associated with it. 
General belief about 
taking risks as part of 
the job 
38 Interviewer: How do accounting professionals feel toward risk taking?  
Respondent: I would say they are risk averse, especially from an audit 
perspective. Accountants are very stringent on how money is being 
categorized because they have to be more conservative on those 
guidelines.  
Beliefs about the role 
played by their 
professionals with 
respect to information 
security in organizations 
38 Interviewer: What role does a marketing  professional think he or she plays 
(i.e., information security in organizations)?  
Respondent: I think we view it as a very minimal role. We view ourself as 
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Beliefs about the 
sources that influence 
the information security-
related beliefs of 
members of their 
profession 
38 Interviewer: Who influences information security-related beliefs of HR 
professionals? Would that be your profession, each individual’s 
organization, or some other factors?  
Respondent: I think organization plays a role and management.  
Interviewer: What about their profession?  
Respondent: I don’t think so.  
Interviewer: Why? 
Respondent: I think it’s one of the routine things they do to comply with 
company policy and legal policy. They just view it as part of their job.  
Beliefs about whether 
their profession offers 
continuing professional 
education courses in 
information security 
37 Interviewer: Do professional associations in your knowledge have security-
related training or awareness programs or workshops? Do they conduct 
these things?  
Respondent: I would think they would. It’s a major aspect today. If you look 
at any journal in security that’s up there just about every major category of 
business is concerned.  
Beliefs about whether 
their profession offers 
continuing education 
courses to improve 
productivity-related skills 
35 Interviewer: In your understanding, do professional associations arrange for   
continuing education courses on improving performance?  
Respondent: Yes they do. They have training programs and conferences 
(They have several conferences a year.) where marketers come together 
and learn.  
Profession’s definition of 
information security 
37 Interviewer: What does the term “information security” mean for HR 
professionals?  
Respondent: For the most part, it relates to employee management (i.e., 
making sure that every aspect of the employee file is kept confidential). 
Only certain individuals have access to various levels of information such 
as social security numbers, birthdays, marital status, and other things like 
that.   
Issues that professionals 
would identify with the 
term “information 
security” 
4 Interviewer: When HR professionals talk about information security, what 
actions come into their mind?  
Respondent: Controlled access files. They think in terms of filing cabinets 
and making sure that they are locked, they think in terms of computer 
systems where electronic employee data is kept. 
The overall outlook 
toward job and 
profession—optimistic or 
pessimistic  
37 Interviewer: In your opinion, do you think members of the accounting 
profession think optimistically or pessimistically? 
Respondent: Optimistic.   
Interviewer: Why?  
Respondent: Because they assume that is the way to do it. So, you just go 
ahead and do whatever. They make their own assumptions.  
Profession’s definition of 
productivity 
35 Interviewer: What does the term “productivity” mean to accounting 
professionals in organizations? 
Respondent: Effective use of time and money to produce a product.  
Beliefs about what their 
profession contributes to 
society 
36 Interviewer: If you had to describe what the accounting profession 
contributes to society, what would you say? 
Respondent: Again, it plays a middle man role between the managers and 
shareholders, banks, and different stakeholders. If there is no accounting or 
auditing, then no information can be verified; thus, you cannot rely on 
information to make a decision. Therefore, banks cannot trust financial 
statements to issue loans and lots of things like that.  
Beliefs about the culture 
that members of their 
profession share 
36 Interviewer: If you had to describe the culture of the marketing profession, 
how would you describe it?  
Respondent: The culture is somewhere in the middle between salespeople 
and (Pauses) I do not know. We have to use some techniques like the 
salespeople; for example, gaining confidence, being liked by the people 
whom we speak to, being a good listener. Also, marketing culture is very 
outspoken. I have to make my point and give my opinions.  
Belief about the core 
values that constitute 
the profession 
37 Interviewer: What would you say the core values of the accounting 
profession are?  
Respondent: Honesty, integrity, conservatism (I am not sure if that’s a 
value). 
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Table B–1: Sample Codes – Continued 
Belief about how much 
the professionals will 
fight to uphold the 
values of the profession 
36 Interviewer: To what extent do marketing professionals believe in the value 
that you stated?  
Respondent: They would fight for these values. Many times you have to go 
out and get the information that you need. You have to speak to people and 
you have to let them know that this is confidential. I will not disclose this 
information and this is just for me to learn about the market. I am trying to 
put that all together and get a big picture of what I am doing, such as 
researching. If you let that information slip, then you lose your face value on 
your clients.   
Belief about how 
professionals will 
respond to detailed 
instructions from 
management 
37 Interviewer: What would be the response of IT professionals if upper 
management tried to specify the details of actions regarding how to do the 
task within the domain of expertise of IT?  
Respondent: It would be counterproductive and risk going back to 
micromanagement. A person of management dictating how to do 
something may not be the best way to do it.  
Belief about how 
professionals will 





37 Interviewer: What would be the response if management tried to specify the 
details of actions outside the domain of expertise of accounting, like 
information security?  
Respondent: I think that is probably a little bit different, because that is 
something that the individual may not be familiar with.  
Beliefs about whether 
members of their 
profession take 
information security 
courses as part of their 
education 
37 Interviewer: Do HR professionals in your opinion take information security-
related courses as part of their education?  
Respondent: I am sure they have some credits they have to fill, but I don’t 
know if it is related to security. 
Belief about what 
happens when there is a 
conflict between the 
values of the profession 
and the values of the 
organization 
37 Interviewer: In case of a conflict between the values of the HR profession 
and the values of the organization that they work in, what would happen?  
Respondent: They are going to go with the values of the organization, 
because that gives them their bread and butter unless it is against the 
law—that would be an exception.  
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